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Trapped in the Amber 
STATE COMMON LAW, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, AND 
FEDERAL ENCLAVES 
Chad DeVeaux† 
“Have you ever seen bugs trapped in amber? . . . Well, here we 
are . . . trapped in the amber of this moment. There is no why.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
“The common law grows like a tree,”2 periodically 
sprouting new branches, shedding dead limbs. Stagnation is 
antithetical to this concept. “[T]he continued vitality of the 
common law . . . depends upon its ability to reflect 
contemporary community values and ethics.”3 As Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr. observed, 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so 
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if 
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, 
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.4  
Led by luminaries like Justice Holmes, Karl Llewellyn, 
and Benjamin Cardozo, the twentieth century witnessed 
dramatic advances in private-law jurisprudence: the virtual 
demise of the centuries-old doctrines of caveat emptor,5 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, Concordia University School of Law (beginning 
fall 2012); Assistant Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law (fall 
2009-spring 2012); LL.M, Harvard University 2008; J.D., University of Notre Dame 
2001; B.A., Bowling Green State University 1997. I extend my deepest thanks to 
Patricia O’Connor and Scott Frey of WSU’s law library for their assistance researching 
this article and to the editors and staff of the Brooklyn Law Review for their hard work 
preparing it for publication. Any mistakes are my responsibility alone. 
 1 KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE 76-77 (1969) (emphasis omitted).  
 2 Professor Lewis Sargentich invoked this metaphor during his 
Jurisprudence class at Harvard Law School in 2007.  
 3 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(quoting Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (1960)). 
 4 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
469 (1897).  
 5 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 
580-82 (1988).  
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contributory negligence,6 and the tort of alienation of 
affections;7 the recognition of an implied warranty of 
habitability for residential dwellings;8 and the legislative 
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).9  
Yet in 2012, more than a million Americans10—probably 
several million11—live and work in places governed by long-
discarded nineteenth-century precepts, jurisprudential purgatories 
where the revenants of long-dead legal doctrines stalk the living.  
We call these places federal enclaves—military bases, 
federal office buildings and residential complexes, post offices, 
and national parks.12 Their existence stems from the 
Constitution’s so-called “Enclave Clause,” Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 17. This provision empowers Congress to 
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of 
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat 
of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like 
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the 
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection 
of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful 
Buildings . . . .13  
With the surrounding state’s consent, Congress may 
establish a federal enclave for any “legitimate governmental 
  
 6  Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 877 (2004).  
 7  Rachel F. Moran, Law and Emotion, Love and Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 747, 774 (2001). 
 8  CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN 
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 499 (6th ed. 2007). 
 9  Robert L. Masterson, Converting Obsolete Musical Media to Current 
Formats: A Copyright Infringement Defense Arising from the Right to Repair and 
Implied Warranty of Fitness, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 281, 298 (2009) (noting that Article 2 of 
the UCC has been adopted by the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
every state except Louisiana).  
 10 Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13 
(D.D.C. June 30, 1998).  
 11 See Lawrence H. Mirel, Restoration Project: Give D.C. the Vote It Once 
Had, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at B01 (“Millions of people live in so-called federal 
enclaves, those territories that have been purchased by, or ceded to, the federal 
government for use as military bases, national parks and other federal facilities.”); 
Gary Thompson & Lois G. Williams, If We Can’t Vote for Them, Why Can They Tax 
Us?, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2000, at B02 (noting that “the millions of federal enclave 
residents enjoy congressional representation—by voting either in their home state or 
the state where the enclave is located”).  
 12 See Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of 
Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
145, 152 (1982) (discussing different types of federal enclaves). 
 13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
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purpose.”14 When an enclave is created, “the jurisdiction 
theretofore residing in the State passes . . . to the United 
States.”15 State regulatory authority over the ceded property 
ceases and the federal authority becomes “exclusive.”16 This 
“grant of ‘exclusive’ legislative power to Congress . . . by its own 
weight, bars state regulation without specific congressional 
action.”17 While the land remains legally part of the state in 
which it sits18 and enclave citizens retain the right to vote in 
state elections,19 from a regulatory standpoint enclaves “are to 
[the surrounding state] as the territory of one of her sister 
states or a foreign land.”20  
Enclave status extinguishes state regulatory authority, 
but “[t]he Constitution does not command that every vestige of 
the laws of the [state] must vanish.”21 In order to ensure “that 
no area will be left without a developed legal system,” state 
laws “existing at the time of the [state’s] surrender of 
sovereignty”22 continue in force as federal laws indefinitely until 
“abrogated” by Congress.23 Such preexisting state laws “lose 
their character as law of the state and become laws of the 
Union.”24 But postcession changes in state law “are not a part of 
the body of laws” because “[c]ongressional action is necessary to 
keep [the enclave’s law] current.”25 The lower federal courts 
have uniformly held that this principle also applies to state 
common-law rules in effect at the time of cession.26  
  
 14 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 n.11 (1976) (citing Collins v. 
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528-30 (1938)). 
 15 Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 657 (1930). 
 16 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 370 (1973).  
 17 Id. (quoting Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963)).  
 18 Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953).  
 19 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1970).  
 20 State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 21 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940).  
 22 Id. at 99. 
 23 Id. at 99-100. 
 24 Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563-64 (E.D. Va. 
1976) (quoting Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 1959)); accord Sadrakula, 
309 U.S. at 100.  
 25 Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99.  
 26 E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower and 
common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on federal 
enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Stuckstede 
v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2010) 
(holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not 
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause 
of action); Bussey v. Edison Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-0158 AHM (RCx), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14057, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (same); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, 
No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) 
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To date, Congress has created more than five thousand 
federal enclaves.27 Collectively, these enclaves encompass 
“[r]oughly thirty percent of land in the United States”—more 
than 659 million acres.28 Over forty are larger than 
Washington, D.C.29 Congress created the vast majority of these 
enclaves between 1840 and 1940.30 Few have been created since 
the end of World War II.31 Absent congressional action, state 
laws effective at the moment the federal government accepted 
jurisdiction over these lands remain in force, frozen in time, 
like bugs trapped in amber.  
Congress has kept criminal law current by enacting the 
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which “makes applicable on 
federal enclaves . . . criminal laws of the State in which the 
enclave is located.”32 Whenever the surrounding state alters its 
criminal law, the ACA incorporates the modification by 
  
(same); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding 
that common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on 
federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); 
Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Labs., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); 
Celli v. Shoell, 995 F. Supp. 1337, 1344 (D. Utah 1998) (same); Snow v. Bechtel Constr. 
Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that common law action for 
wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established 
before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft 
Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 88 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that pre-
cession state common law governing personal-injury torts no longer applied within 
federal enclave because Congress enacted statute abrogating application of pre-cession 
personal-injury torts and applying modern state common law to enclave-based 
personal-injury and wrongful-death actions), overruled on other grounds by Vasina v. 
Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1981); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, 
Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that common law action for 
wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established 
before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Buttery v. Robbins, 14 S.E.2d 544, 
548 (Va. 1941) (citing Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929), for the proposition 
that state common law rules in effect at time of cession remain in force on an enclave 
until abrogated by Congress); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. Co. v. Parker, 147 S.E. 461, 463 (Va. 
1929) (holding that state common law rules in effect at time of cession remain in force on 
an enclave until abrogated by Congress), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 
(1950), as recognized in Hudgins v. Jones, 138 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 1964).  
 27 Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13 
(D.D.C. June 30, 1998).  
 28 Jonathan Turley, Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitutionality of Partial 
Representation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 362 
(2008) (emphasis added).  
 29 Carl Strass, Federal Enclaves—Through the Looking Glass—Darkly, 15 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 754, 755 (1964). 
 30 Congress amended the United States Code in 1940 to stop the flood of 
enclave creation “end[ing] a period of 100 years during which the Federal Government, 
with relatively minor exceptions, acquired legislative jurisdiction over substantially all 
of its land acquisitions within the States.” Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 152 n.21 
(quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION 49-50 (1969)).  
 31 Id.  
 32 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 158 (1998).  
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reference into the federalized state law governing the enclave.33 
Congress has similarly incorporated contemporary state 
wrongful-death,34 personal-injury,35 and workers’ compensation 
statutes36 into enclave law. But Congress has otherwise failed 
to “keep . . . current”37 the body of private law governing 
enclaves.38 With respect to legal areas neglected by Congress, 
federal enclaves have devolved into jurisprudential Jurassic 
Parks, “sanctuar[ies] for the obsolete restrictions of the 
common law.”39  
One such arena is labor law. More than a million people 
are likely employed on federal enclaves.40 Almost every state 
endows employees with greater rights and remedies than 
federal law requires.41 Such state-enacted protections include: 
  
 33 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 292 (1958).  
 34 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006).  
 35 Id.  
 36 40 U.S.C. § 3172 (2006).  
 37 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940). 
 38 See Stephen E. Castlen & Gregory O. Block, Exclusive Federal Legislative 
Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It!, 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 124 (1997) (“Congress . . . has not 
passed legislation for enclaves relative to contracts, sales, agency, probate, 
guardianship, family relations, and torts not involving death or personal injury.”). 
 39 Capetola v. Barclay-White Co., 48 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1943). 
 40 No official statistics are available concerning the number of individuals 
employed on federal enclaves. I base my assertion that the number likely exceeds one 
million upon several facts. First, nearly thirty percent of the United States falls within 
the boundaries of a federal enclave. Turley, supra note 28, at 362. Second, more than a 
million citizens live on enclaves. Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22848, at *13 (D.D.C. June 30, 1998). Indeed, several million people likely 
reside on federal enclaves. Mirel, supra note 11, at B01; Thompson & Williams, supra 
note 11, at B02. Finally, the sheer number of decisions concerning suits by federal 
enclave employees suggests that the number of individuals employed in such places is 
very large. E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D.N.J. 2010); Klausner v. 
Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 
2010); Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 15, 2010); Rosseter v. Indus. Light & Magic, No. C 08-04545 WHA, 2009 WL 
210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-
VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008); Mersnick v. 
USProtect Corp., No. C-06-03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 
2007); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at 
*3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 
545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Hutchinson v. Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 
WL 691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2004); Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 
F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998); George v. UXB Int’l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW, 1996 WL 
241624, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996); Miller v. Wackenhut Serv., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 
697, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 
(C.D. Cal. 1986); Lockhart v. MVM, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 212-13 (Ct. App. 2009); 
Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Dep’t 
of Labor & Indus. v. Dirt & Aggregate, Inc., 837 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Wash. 1992). 
 41 Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State 
Attorneys General Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 495, 503 (2006). 
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• the right to higher minimum wages than those 
guaranteed by federal law,42 
• the right to receive overtime under circumstances not 
required by federal law,43 
• the right to receive benefits for dependents and 
domestic partners not provided by federal law,44 
• greater rights to medical leave to care for ailing family 
members than those provided by federal law,45 
• protections against discrimination not provided by 
federal law,46 
• more stringent workplace safety standards than 
federal law requires,47 and 
• common law causes of action against employers for the 
termination of at-will employees for reasons or under 
circumstances that violate public policy,48 including the 
termination of whistleblowers.49  
Because nineteenth- and early twentieth-century precepts 
govern most aspects of enclave private law, civilians employed on 
federal enclaves typically enjoy none of these rights.50  
Modern state private law should not necessarily extend 
to government employees or military personnel acting in their 
official capacities within an enclave. Such extension of state 
law might “frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the 
enclave.51 But no compelling reason exists to deny civilians—and 
government and military officials acting in their private 
capacities—the application of modern private law. Today, 
private corporations unaffiliated with the military derive 
millions of dollars in revenue from transactions conducted 
within federal enclaves.52 A teenager employed at a fast-food 
restaurant within an enclave ought to be entitled to the same 
wage-and-hour and workplace-safety laws as an employee who 
works just outside the boundaries of the enclave. Under the 
current law, he is not. An army servicewoman who purchases a 
bicycle for her child from an enclave retailer ought to enjoy the 
  
 42 See infra note 294 and accompanying text.  
 43 See infra note 299 and accompanying text.  
 44 See infra note 296 and accompanying text.  
 45 See infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra note 300 and accompanying text.  
 47 See infra note 302 and accompanying text.  
 48 See infra note 313 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 303-25 and accompanying text. 
 51 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).  
 52 See infra Parts V & VI. 
2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 505 
implied warranties imposed by the UCC. Because most enclaves 
predate the adoption of the UCC, such sales are virtually always 
governed by the outmoded doctrine of caveat emptor.53  
I am personally acquainted with the eccentricities of 
federal-enclave law. As a young attorney, I represented a pro 
bono client facing eviction from a residential apartment in the 
Presidio of San Francisco, a federal enclave administered by 
the National Parks Service.54 I removed the case to federal 
court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction because the 
law governing his suit was California’s 1872 unlawful-detainer 
statute, which lived on as “‘federalized’ state law.”55 The 
Presidio is a bustling commercial center in the heart of San 
Francisco. Millions of dollars of commercial transactions take 
place on the Presidio each year.56 Yet nineteenth-century 
private law governs most conduct there. As then-Congressman 
James Buchanan observed in 1823, federal enclaves represent 
a “palpable defect in our system” because “a great variety of 
actions, to which a high degree of moral guilt is attached, and 
which are punished . . . at the common law . . . by every 
State . . . may be committed with impunity [within enclaves].”57 
So it is with the Presidio today.58  
The premise that when jurisdiction is transferred from 
one government to another existing laws remain in force until 
abrogated by the new sovereign is derived from international 
  
 53 Most federal enclaves were established between 1840 and 1940. Wilkinson, 
supra note 12, at 152 n.21. Most states enacted the Uniform Commercial Code during 
the 1960s. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code: The 
Next Generation, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 101 (2004).  
 54 See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2005).  
 55 Id. at 1037. As “federalized” law, the “assimilated state [unlawful detainer] 
law [wa]s distinctly federal in nature,” thus “its application establishe[d] the basis for 
federal question jurisdiction.” Id. at 1038. My client resided in federal housing. Id. at 1038 
n.7. I removed the case to federal court because I planned to challenge his eviction on due-
process grounds and I preferred to make this argument before a federal forum. This 
strategy proved successful. See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, No. C05-01661MJJ, 2005 
WL 3882063, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2005). While my client resided in federally 
subsidized housing, notably, the majority of housing units on the Presidio are not 
subsidized and operate for profit. Dan Levy, A Green Belt in the Black: Presidio as National 
Park Achieves Self-Sustaining Goal 8 Years Early, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 2005, at A-1.  
 56 Levy, supra note 55, at A-1. 
 57 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998) (quoting 40 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 930 (1823)).  
 58 The state of the law in the Presidio is reminiscent of the phenomenon 
astronomers refer to as a singularity—the center of a black hole where the past and 
present collide rendering invalid the ordinary laws of physics. Marcus Chown, Dark 
Matter Rockets and Black Hole Starships, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 28, 2009, at 34, 36-37.  
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law.59 The principle “assures that no area however small will be 
left without a developed legal system for private rights.”60 But 
these assimilated laws are not meant to live on into perpetuity. 
They are intended to serve only as a jurisprudential backstop to 
prevent anarchy during the transition period.61 Upon accepting 
jurisdiction, the new sovereign assumes the responsibility to 
actually govern the territory.62 In common-law countries, the 
new sovereign’s courts likewise assume the responsibility to 
promulgate common-law rules for the territory.63 I posit that 
enclave common law should not remain forever frozen in time at 
the moment of cession. While state court common-lawmaking 
jurisdiction is extinguished, the responsibility to maintain 
enclave private law should pass from the state to the federal 
courts and become a matter of federal common law.  
Congress and the federal courts share the blame for the 
nonsensical state of enclave law. Both have wholly abdicated 
their respective responsibilities. Congress has failed to enact 
private-law legislation for enclaves. More critically, the federal 
courts have refused to assume responsibility for enclave 
common-law development.  
This article argues that as federal instrumentalities, 
enclaves should be subject to federal common law. Moreover, 
federal courts should use their discretion to borrow64 the 
common law of the surrounding state, so long as doing so does 
not “frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the particular 
enclave.65 Because many aspects of state labor law, like wage-
and-hour provisions, cannot be enacted through the common-
lawmaking process, Congress should enact a statute, similar to 
the ACA, making state labor laws applicable to civilians 
employed within federal enclaves.  
  
 59 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (holding that 
Spanish private law governed Florida territory until abrogated by Congress).  
 60 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (citing Chi., 
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 542 (1885)).  
 61 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo. 1960) 
(asserting that adoption of preexisting state laws was intended to temporarily “fill the 
vacuum which would otherwise exist” in enclave private law).  
 62 See United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 253-54 (1819) (ruling 
that acquisition of possession and control of territory endows the sovereign with 
exclusive prerogative to govern that territory).  
 63 See Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the 
Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265-66 (1963) (arguing that courts 
historically assume responsibility for private-law development subject to sporadic 
legislative involvement).  
 64 California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283 
(1982); accord United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979). 
 65 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.  
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Part I of this article explores the origin and development 
of the federal-enclave doctrine from its genesis, as a rule of 
international law adopted by the Marshall Court in 1828,66 to the 
Court’s most recent reaffirmation of the principle in 1973.67  
Part II addresses Congress’s authority to assimilate 
contemporary state law, making such law applicable within 
federal enclaves. In particular, this part examines federal statutes 
making modern state criminal codes, workers’ compensation laws, 
and wrongful-death acts applicable in federal enclaves.  
Part III discusses limitations upon the authority ceded by 
the states to the federal government. This part examines the 
right of states to reserve limited legislative authority as a 
condition of cession. In addition, this part addresses the 
Supreme Court’s somewhat paradoxical assertion that an 
enclave is “to [the surrounding state] as the territory of one of 
her sister states or a foreign land,”68 yet nonetheless “d[oes] not 
cease to be a part of [the surrounding state].”69 This part also 
addresses the right of enclave residents to vote in state elections.  
Part IV addresses the inapplicability of modern state 
choice-of-law rules in litigation arising on federal enclaves. 
Today, most states employ interest-balancing tests when 
deciding which jurisdiction’s law to apply in litigation involving 
contact with multiple states.70 Because the law applicable to 
federal enclaves is viewed as federal law—notwithstanding its 
origin as state law—the Supremacy Clause bars courts from 
balancing the enclave’s interests against those of surrounding 
states.71 The Supremacy Clause dictates that the enclave’s 
federalized state law must be applied when the pertinent 
events giving rise to a suit occur on a federal enclave even if 
the surrounding state possesses materially greater interests in 
the litigation’s outcome.  
Part V explores some of the federal-enclave doctrine’s 
perverse effects. Because the doctrine freezes in time existing 
state private law—both statutory and common law—long-dead 
canons such as the tort of alienation of affections and the 
doctrine of caveat emptor live on in most enclaves as 
  
 66 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828). 
 67 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973) (reaffirming 
doctrine of exclusive federal jurisdiction over enclaves). 
 68 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 69 Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953).  
 70 See infra Part IV. 
 71 See infra Part IV. 
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jurisprudential zombies.72 Meanwhile, modern legal innovations 
like comparative fault and the UCC are inapplicable because 
post-acquisition changes to state law do not apply within 
enclaves absent congressional action.73  
Part VI addresses the enclave doctrine’s pernicious 
impact upon labor law. In the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the vast majority of states amended their labor codes 
to provide employees greater rights and remedies than those 
mandated by federal law.74 Additionally, state courts now offer 
employees common-law claims for relief not recognized by 
federal law, particularly the tort of wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy.75 States did not recognize these rights 
and remedies when most federal enclaves were established. 
Thus, federal courts routinely dismiss such claims when 
brought by civilian workers employed by private corporations 
on federal enclaves.76  
Finally in Part VII, I offer two solutions to the problems 
posed by the federal-enclave doctrine. First, I argue that the 
lower federal courts are incorrect in their conclusion that the 
federal-enclave doctrine freezes in time state common-law 
rules. I assert that as federal instrumentalities, enclaves fall 
within the ambit of federal common law. Since no need exists 
for enclaves to be governed by “a nationally uniform body of 
[common] law,”77 federal courts should, for each enclave, use 
their discretion to borrow78 the common law of the surrounding 
state.79 Second, I propose that Congress enact an Assimilative 
Labor Act—in the spirit of the ACA—affording the rights and 
remedies provided by contemporary state labor statutes to 
nongovernmental workers employed within federal enclaves.  
  
 72 See infra Part V. 
 73 See infra Part V. 
 74 See infra Part VI. 
 75 See infra Part VI.  
 76 See infra Part VI. 
 77 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). 
 78 California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283 
(1982); accord Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28.  
 79 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.  
2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 509 
I. STATE LAWS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF FEDERAL 
ACQUISITION REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL CHANGED BY 
CONGRESS 
A. The Ballad of McGlinn’s Cow 
The genesis of the federal-enclave doctrine lies in the 
Supreme Court’s 1885 opinion Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railway Co. v. McGlinn.80 The decision addresses the 
application of a Kansas statute to the Fort Leavenworth 
Military Reservation, a federal enclave.81  
On February 22, 1875, Kansas’s legislature passed an 
act ceding jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth to the federal 
government.82 The defendant, Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railway, operated a railroad that passed through the 
reservation.83 In February 1881, a cow owned by the plaintiff, 
McGlinn, wandered onto the reservation and was struck by one 
of the defendant’s trains.84 McGlinn brought suit under a 
Kansas statute enacted in 1874, which rendered railroads 
strictly liable for collisions with livestock if the railroad failed 
to enclose its tracks “with a good and lawful fence to prevent 
the animal from being on the road.”85 The defendant railroad 
failed to fence its tracks on the reservation.86 A jury awarded 
McGlinn forty-five dollars in damages, twenty-five dollars for 
the value of the cow, and twenty dollars in attorneys’ fees.87 The 
railroad appealed the verdict, asserting that the Kansas 
statute had no application because the reservation was a 
federal enclave. The case ultimately found its way to the 
Supreme Court’s docket in 1885.  
The McGlinn Court concluded that the U.S. government 
exercised exclusive dominion over Fort Leavenworth because it 
was a federal enclave.88 Thus, upon ceding jurisdiction to the 
federal government, Kansas forfeited all regulatory authority 
over the reservation.89 But this did not end the inquiry.  
  
 80 114 U.S. 542 (1885).  
 81 Id. at 543-44.  
 82 Id. at 544.  
 83 Id. at 543.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 544.  
 86 Id. at 543-44.  
 87 Id. at 544.  
 88 Id. at 545-46.  
 89 Id.  
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The Court applied a rule of international law it had 
utilized fifty-seven years earlier in American Insurance Co. v. 
Canter.90 Canter recognizes “that whenever political jurisdiction 
and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one 
nation or sovereign to another, the . . . laws which are intended 
for the protection of private rights continue in force until . . . . by 
direct action of the new government, they are altered or 
repealed.”91 “This assures that no area however small will be left 
without a developed legal system for private rights.”92  
The Canter Court concluded that property-rights 
disputes in the newly acquired Florida Territory were governed 
by Spanish laws in effect at the time Spain ceded the 
territory.93 The McGlinn Court applied this principle to federal 
enclaves and concluded that state private-law statutes in effect 
at the time of cession remain in force until altered by 
Congress.94 Kansas’s cattle-wounding law predated the federal 
government’s acquisition of Fort Leavenworth, and Congress 
had taken no action to abrogate the statute.95 Thus, the law 
remained in effect on the enclave as federalized state law, and 
the trial court properly entered judgment for McGlinn 
pursuant to that law.96  
  
 90 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).  
 91 McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546-47 (citing Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 542). 
 92 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (citing 
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 542).  
 93 Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 544. Of course, Spanish laws in effect at the time of 
Florida’s acquisition that conflict with American law—constitutional or statutory—would 
terminate when the United States assumed jurisdiction. As the McGlinn Court noted: 
As a matter of course, all laws . . . in conflict with the political character, 
institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. 
Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power—and the 
latter is involved in the former—to the United States, the laws of the country 
in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or 
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once 
cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the 
laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by 
existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with 
respect to other laws affecting the possession, use and transfer of property, 
and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote 
its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule 
is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct 
action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. 
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546-47.  
 94 McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 547.  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id.  
2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 511 
B. While State Laws in Effect at the Moment of Cession 
Live On as Federalized Law, Post-Acquisition Changes 
in State Law Have No Effect Within Federal Enclaves 
The McGlinn doctrine recognizes that state laws in force 
at the time of cession that do not conflict with federal law live 
on as federalized state law until abrogated by Congress.97 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle in the 
years since it decided McGlinn.98  
McGlinn, like Canter, embraces the legal fiction that 
Congress consciously chose to incorporate the territory’s 
existing body of private law into federal law by reference at the 
moment of acquisition.99 The doctrine presumes Congress’s 
awareness of laws in effect at the moment of cession.100 But 
congressional assent cannot be inferred with respect to changes 
in the law made after the state cedes regulatory authority to 
the federal government.101 “Since only the law in effect at the 
time of the transfer of jurisdiction continues in force, future 
statutes of the state are not a part of the body of laws in the 
ceded area. Congressional action is necessary to keep it 
current.”102 Accordingly, the body of private law governing an 
enclave in effect at the moment of cession remains in force—
effectively frozen in time—until altered by Congress.  
  
 97 Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563-64 (E.D. Va. 
1976) (citing James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940)); accord Swords to 
Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036-37 (N.D. Cal. 2005). As the Supreme 
Court later summarized, McGlinn stands for the proposition that:  
The Constitution does not command that every vestige of the laws of the 
former sovereignty must vanish. On the contrary its language has long been 
interpreted so as to permit the continuance until abrogated of those rules 
existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty which govern the rights of 
the occupants of the territory transferred. This assures that no area however 
small will be left without a developed legal system for private rights. 
Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99-100 (citing McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 542) (footnote omitted).  
 98 E.g., United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1973); Paul 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 265 (1963); Pac. Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 318 
U.S. 285, 294 (1943); Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 95; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 
647, 657 (1930); McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 542.  
 99 McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546-47 (citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 
511, 542 (1828)). 
 100 See Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99-100.  
 101 See id. at 100.  
 102 Id.  
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C. Lower Federal Courts Have Uniformly Held that the 
McGlinn Doctrine Applies to State Statutory and 
Common-Law Rules Alike 
Lower federal courts have uniformly concluded that the 
McGlinn doctrine dictates that “state common law rules in 
effect at the time of cession,” like state statutes, “become the 
law of the enclave . . . until displaced by act of Congress.”103 
Courts and commentators frequently attribute this assertion to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant.104  
In Fant, the Court considered whether to apply an 
Arkansas statute to a tort action arising in Hot Springs National 
Park.105 Arkansas ceded exclusive jurisdiction over the park to 
the federal government in 1904.106 At the time of the transfer, 
Arkansas’s common law subjected innkeepers to strict liability 
for fire damage to their guests’ personal property.107 In 1913, 
Arkansas’s Legislature statutorily repealed the common law 
strict-liability rule, limiting inn keepers’ liability to cases of 
negligence.108  
In 1923, a fire destroyed the Arlington Hotel, which was 
located in the park.109 Thereafter, several guests sued the hotel’s 
owners in Arkansas state court seeking damages for personal 
property lost in the fire.110 Arkansas’s Supreme Court concluded 
that the state’s 1913 statute was inapplicable because it post-
dated cession of the park to the federal government.111 The 
  
 103 Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 
88 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that pre-cession state common law governing personal-
injury torts no longer applied within federal enclave because Congress enacted statute 
abrogating application of pre-cession personal-injury torts and applying modern state 
common law to enclave-based personal-injury and wrongful-death actions), overruled 
on other grounds by Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1981).  
 104 278 U.S. 439 (1929). Courts and commentators have cited Fant for the 
proposition that “state common law rules in effect at the time of cession become the law 
of the enclave until displaced by act of Congress.” Quadrini, 425 F. Supp. at 88; accord 
Buttery v. Robbins, 14 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Va. 1941) (same); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. Co. v. 
Parker, 147 S.E. 461, 464 (Va. 1929) (same), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-34 (1950), as recognized in Hudgins v. Jones, 138 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 1964); 
Michael J. Malinowski, Federal Enclaves and Local Law: Carving Out a Domestic 
Violence Exception to Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction, 100 YALE L.J. 189, 194 (1990) 
(citing Fant for the proposition that “[s]tate . . . common law changes made subsequent 
to the transfer . . . have no force within the enclave unless authorized by specific 
congressional legislation”).  
 105 Fant, 278 U.S. at 445.  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 445-46.  
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at 449.  
 110 Id. at 445.  
 111 Id. at 446.  
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Arkansas court chose to apply the state’s former common-law 
rule, subjecting the innkeeper to strict liability.112 The United 
States Supreme Court reviewed the case in 1929.113  
The Fant Court reaffirmed that “only the [state] law in 
effect at the time of the [enclave’s] transfer of jurisdiction 
continues in force” and that “future statutes of the state are not 
part of the [enclave’s] body of laws” because “Congressional 
action is necessary to keep it current.”114 Courts have since cited 
Fant for the proposition that “state common law rules in effect 
at the time of cession . . . become the law of the enclave until 
displaced by act of Congress.”115 But this constitutes a 
fundamental misreading of Fant.  
Fant does not contemplate the status of enclave common 
law. Rather, the sole question before the Court in Fant 
concerned whether a national park could constitute a federal 
enclave.116 The innkeeper asserted that “no jurisdiction 
was . . . conferred on the United States” because Congress 
could not create an enclave for such a purpose.117 The innkeeper 
defendant relied on the canon expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, which posits that “one item of [an] associated group or 
series excludes another left unmentioned.”118 The defendant 
argued that by enumerating the purposes for which Congress 
could establish enclaves—“Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-
Yards, and other needful Buildings”119—the Constitution 
impliedly prohibits the establishment of enclaves for purposes 
not enumerated, including national parks.120 Accordingly, the 
innkeeper asserted that the Arkansas court erred in refusing to 
  
 112 Id. at 445-46.  
 113 Id. at 439. 
 114 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (citing Fant, 
278 U.S. at 445-46).  
 115 Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 
88 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that pre-cession state common law governing personal-
injury torts no longer applied within federal enclave because Congress enacted statute 
abrogating application of pre-cession personal-injury torts and applying modern state 
common law to enclave-based personal-injury and wrongful-death actions), overruled 
on other grounds by Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1981); 
accord Buttery v. Robbins, 14 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Va. 1941); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. Co. v. 
Parker, 147 S.E. 461, 464 (Va. 1929), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 
(1950), as recognized in Hudgins v. Jones, 138 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 1964); Malinowski, 
supra note 104, at 194. 
 116 Fant, 278 U.S. at 449.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (quoting United 
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).  
 119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.  
 120 Fant, 278 U.S. at 449-51.  
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apply the 1913 state statute because the United States never 
validly divested Arkansas of jurisdiction over the park.121 The 
Fant Court unanimously rejected the contention that 
Congress’s authority to establish federal enclaves is limited to 
the purposes enumerated in the Enclave Clause.122 The Court 
did not address the status of preexisting state common law in a 
federal enclave.  
Fant predated Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins123 by nine 
years. At the time of the Fant decision, the Court still 
subscribed to the Swift v. Tyson doctrine.124 Swift dictated “that 
federal courts ha[d] the power to use their judgment as to what 
the rules of common law are.”125 Thus, Fant does not support 
the proposition that federal courts must apply preexisting state 
common law rules on federal enclaves because, pursuant to the 
Swift doctrine, the Fant Court necessarily regarded Arkansas’s 
common law as nonbinding authority regardless of whether the 
federal government exercised exclusive jurisdiction over Hot 
Springs National Park.126 Prior to Erie, the Supreme Court 
viewed common law not as a form of state action, but rather as 
“‘a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State 
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.’”127 
Thus, in the absence of a controlling statute, courts—both state 
and federal—possessed “the power to use their judgment as to 
what the rules of common law are.”128 The Fant Court did not 
grant review regarding the appropriate rule of common law, nor 
did the Court venture an opinion on the matter. The Court 
merely concluded that “the cession of exclusive jurisdiction” over 
the park “was valid” and the Arkansas statute “modifying the 
liability of innkeepers, passed after the cession, did not extend 
over the ceded land.”129 Accordingly, Fant cannot stand for the 
  
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. at 454-55. The Court unequivocally reaffirmed this position in Collins v. 
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), concluding that the United States 
validly acquired exclusive jurisdiction over Yosemite National Park. Id. at 530. Thus, it is 
now well settled that Congress may establish federal enclaves within States for “any 
legitimate governmental purpose.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 n.11 (1976).  
 123 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 124 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.  
 125 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (explaining the underlying assumption of Swift).  
 126 See id. at 79-80.  
 127 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).  
 128 Id.  
 129 Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 440 (1929) (syllabus); accord 
Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242, 244 (1934).  
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proposition that federal courts are bound to apply state common 
law rules in effect at the time of an enclave’s cession.  
The lower federal courts’ uniform misconstruction of 
Fant has wreaked more havoc than any other aspect of federal-
enclave doctrine. Federal acquisition should not freeze enclave 
common law in time. Rather, the power to promulgate common 
law for the affected territory must necessarily pass from the 
state courts to the federal courts as a matter of federal common 
law. While legislatures sometimes intervene to correct 
perceived deficiencies, responsibility for the vast majority of 
private-law development rests with the courts in their 
common-lawmaking function.130  
D. Contrary to the Hopeful Claims of Some Commentators, 
the McGlinn Doctrine Remains in Force 
The Supreme Court added a wrinkle to the McGlinn 
doctrine with its 1963 decision in Paul v. United States.131 Paul 
addresses the applicability of regulations promulgated by 
California’s Department of Food and Agriculture governing the 
price of milk sold on three military bases within the state.132 The 
Court found that the three bases each constituted federal 
enclaves133 and that the state agency promulgated the price 
regulations after California ceded jurisdiction over the bases to the 
federal government.134 Based on these facts, the United States 
asserted that the McGlinn doctrine dictated that only the agency’s 
regulations in effect at the time of cession applied to the sale of 
milk on the three enclaves.135 The Court rejected this contention.136  
Paul deviates from the previous strict application of the 
McGlinn doctrine by allowing state administrative-agency 
regulations promulgated after federal acquisition to be applied 
within a federal enclave.137 Paul holds that such regulations 
apply on the enclave if the “same basic” state-enabling act138 
  
 130 Edward A. Tomlinson, Judicial Lawmaking in a Code Jurisdiction: A 
French Saga on Certainty of Price in Contract Law, 58 LA. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997). 
 131 371 U.S. 245 (1963).  
 132 Id. at 247. The three bases were Travis Air Force Base, Castle Air Force 
Base, and the Oakland Army Terminal. Id.  
 133 Id. at 263-64.  
 134 Id. at 268-69.  
 135 Id. at 265. 
 136 See id.  
 137 See id.  
 138 An enabling act is a “statute conferring powers on a[n] [administrative] agenc[y] 
to carry out various delegated tasks.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 592 (2d pocket ed. 1996).  
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authorizing the agency to promulgate the regulations “ha[s] 
been in effect [prior to the] time[s]” of the federal acquisitions 
of the property comprising the enclave.139 The Paul Court was 
likely motivated by the fact that strict application of the 
McGlinn doctrine would lead to a particularly nonsensical 
result. The regulations at issue imposed “price controls over 
[the sale of] milk.”140 The enabling act tasked California’s 
Department of Food and Agriculture to establish minimum 
prices sufficient to guarantee milk producers “stability and 
prosperity”141 in light of market conditions and rates of 
inflation.142 If the price regulations were frozen in time, the 
government-mandated milk prices applicable when Paul was 
decided in 1963 would have been those in effect when the bases 
were established in 1942.143 This would undermine the purpose 
of the statute—which was incorporated into federal law upon 
the enclaves’ creation—to guarantee producers “stability and 
prosperity” as the applicable prices could not be adjusted to 
account for present market conditions.144  
Some commentators have argued that Paul’s apparent 
deviation from the strict rule against the application of post-
acquisition state law demonstrates a repudiation of McGlinn’s 
doctrine of exclusive federal jurisdiction.145 The Court’s 
subsequent decision in United States v. State Tax Commission 
of Mississippi146—its most recent federal-enclave opinion—
proved this assertion false, reaffirming McGlinn. The Court 
held that the Enclave Clause’s “grant of ‘exclusive’ legislative 
power to Congress . . . by its own weight, bars state regulation 
without specific congressional action,”147 subject only to the 
proposition that existing “local law[s] not inconsistent with 
federal policy remain[] in force until altered by national 
legislation.”148 State laws “adopted . . . after the transfer of 
sovereignty” are “without force in [an] enclave.”149  
  
 139 Paul, 371 U.S. at 269.  
 140 Id.  
 141 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 735.1(d) (1937). 
 142 Challenge Cream & Butter Ass’n v. Parker, 142 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal. 1943).  
 143 Paul, 371 U.S. at 266.  
 144 See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 735.1(d).  
 145 See, e.g., Richard T. Altieri, Federal Enclaves: The Impact of Exclusive 
Legislative Jurisdiction Upon Civil Litigation, 72 MIL. L. REV. 55, 68 (1976). 
 146 412 U.S. 363 (1973).  
 147 Id. at 370 (quoting Paul, 371 U.S. at 263).  
 148 Id. at 369.  
 149 Id.  
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Tax Commission demonstrates that Paul does not stand 
for the proposition, advanced by some scholars, that a state can 
“legislate for [an] enclave, provided that no interference with 
federal law . . . is involved.”150 Rather, Paul rests on a fiction 
common in administrative-law decisions: “The rulemaking power 
granted to an administrative agency charged with the 
administration of [an enabling act] is not the power to make law” 
but rather “is ‘the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect 
the will of [the legislature] as expressed by the statute.’”151 Since 
the expression of legislative “will” at issue in Paul predated the 
enclaves’ establishment, that “will” was incorporated into and 
lived on as federal law. Subsequent administrative regulations 
“carry[ing] into effect” that legislative “will” applied on the 
enclaves as federal law because the enabling act manifesting it 
predated the transfer of sovereignty.152  
E. Subsequent Cessions Expanding Existing Federal 
Enclaves Have Created Jurisprudential “Crazy Quilts,” 
Where Different Laws Apply in Different Parts of the 
Same Enclave 
The federal government has compounded the McGlinn 
doctrine’s complexity through piecemeal expansion of federal 
enclaves over time.153 Because McGlinn incorporates existing 
state law into federal law at the moment of cession, the 
applicable private law may vary from one parcel of land to 
another. These circumstances “require the irrational 
application of different law to the various components of a 
single” federal enclave.154 The private law applicable within a 
particular enclave may literally differ from one side of a street 
to the other because the United States acquired jurisdiction 
over the respective tracts at different times.  
  
 150 Altieri, supra note 145, at 68 (emphasis added).  
 151 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (quoting Dixon v. 
United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).  
 152 See Paul, 371 U.S. at 269. 
 153 Prof’l Helicopter Pilots Ass’n v. Lear Siegler Servs., 326 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 
1311 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 2004), aff’d, 153 F. App’x 630 (11th Cir. 2005); Altieri, supra note 145, 
at 88 (“[M]ost enclave areas are composed of tracts of land acquired at different times.”); 
Castlen & Block, supra note 38, at 118 (“It is not unusual for property under federal 
control, including many military installations, to have been acquired piecemeal over 
extended periods of time by a variety of methods. . . . [T]he type of existing legislative 
jurisdiction may vary depending on when and how the specific tract was acquired.”).  
 154 Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 564 (E.D. Va. 1976); 
accord Prof’l Helicopter Pilots Ass’n, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 n.1; Castlen & Block, 
supra note 38, at 118.  
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An analogous state of affairs exists in Indian Country. 
The federal government exercises, with certain exceptions, 
exclusive jurisdiction over land that is owned by Indian tribes 
or held in trust by the United States for the benefit of a tribe.155 
But when title to tribal land passes to a non-Indian, federal 
jurisdiction is terminated and the states exercise primary 
jurisdiction.156 The result of this policy is a jurisprudential 
“crazy quilt”157 in which “isolated tracts” of property under 
exclusive federal jurisdiction “may be scattered checkerboard 
fashion over a territory otherwise under state jurisdiction.”158 
The McGlinn doctrine creates the same nonsensical “crazy 
quilt” within many federal enclaves.159  
II. CONGRESS MAY INCORPORATE THE SURROUNDING 
STATE’S CONTEMPORARY LAW BY REFERENCE, MAKING 
SUCH LAW APPLICABLE WITHIN ENCLAVES AS 
FEDERALIZED STATE LAW  
While “[t]he grant of exclusive legislative power to 
Congress over enclaves . . . bars state regulation,” state law 
may nonetheless apply within an enclave if “Congress consents 
to [such] state regulation.”160 Courts generally read 
congressional consent to state regulation quite narrowly: 
[B]ecause of the fundamental importance of the principles shielding 
federal installations and activities from regulation by the states, an 
authorization of state regulation is found only when and to the extent 
there is a clear congressional mandate, specific congressional action that 
makes this authorization of state regulation clear and unambiguous.161  
Although consent to state regulation within enclaves 
has been rare, Congress has exercised its power to incorporate 
contemporary state law to govern a few well-defined subjects.  
  
 155 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2006).  
 156 DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 429 n.3 (1975).  
 157 Id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 158 Id. at 429 n.3 (majority opinion).  
 159 Altieri, supra note 145, at 88 (noting that “most enclave areas are 
composed of tracts of land acquired at different times”).  
 160 Miller v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 697, 700 (W.D. Mo. 1992) 
(citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963)). 
 161 Id. (citing Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976)).  
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A. The Assimilative Crimes Act 
The First Congress recognized that the absence of state 
regulation threatened to render enclaves lawless territories.162 
To avert this problem, Congress enacted the Federal Crimes 
Act in 1790, “defin[ing] a number of federal crimes” prohibited 
within enclave boundaries.163 Because the duty to enact 
comprehensive criminal codes typically rests with the states, 
Congress’s piecemeal enumeration of offenses proved 
insufficient.164 For this reason, in 1825 Congress enacted the 
first ACA, which “adopt[ed] for each enclave the offenses made 
punishable by the State in which it was situated.”165 The ACA 
evidenced a congressional “policy of general conformity to local 
[criminal] law.”166 The Act incorporated state criminal law into 
the federal law governing federal enclaves.167 The Act did not 
delegate any jurisdiction to the states. Instead, it dictated that 
violations of the surrounding state’s criminal laws constituted 
violations of federal law triable in federal court.168  
The 1825 version of the ACA “made no specific reference 
to new offenses that might be added by the State after the 
enactment of the . . . Act.”169 Thus, enclave criminal law—like 
private law assimilated into federal law at the time of 
acquisition—became stale over time. 
Due to the limitation of the [ACA] of 1825 to state laws in force at 
the time of its own enactment, the Act gradually lost much of its 
effectiveness in maintaining current conformity with state criminal 
laws. This result has been well called one of static conformity. To 
renew such conformity, Congress . . . enacted comparable 
Assimilative Crimes Acts in 1866, . . . in 1898, . . . in 1909, . . . in 
1933, . . . in 1935, . . . [and] in 1940 . . . .170 
Apparently growing weary of the need to constantly renew 
the ACA, Congress amended the statute in 1948 to apply to “state 
laws . . . enacted” both “before” and “after” the Act so that it “at 
once reflects every addition, repeal or amendment of a state 
  
 162 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 288 (1958).  
 163 Id.  
 164 Id. at 288-89; United States v. Press Publ’g Co., 219 U.S. 1, 12 (1911) 
(noting that the Federal Crimes Act was insufficient because “[t]he criminal code of the 
United States is singularly defective and inefficient”). 
 165 Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 289.  
 166 Id.  
 167 United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 931 (10th Cir. 2008).  
 168 Id.  
 169 Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 290.  
 170 Id. at 291.  
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[criminal] law.”171 The 1948 ACA drew the fire of critics 
questioning Congress’s authority to incorporate future state penal 
statutes prospectively.172 The Supreme Court settled this issue ten 
years later with its decision in United States v. Sharpnack.173  
The Sharpnack Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
ACA. In 1955, the United States indicted Gerald Sharpnack 
under the ACA for allegedly committing sex crimes within the 
boundaries of Randolph Air Force Base, a federal enclave in 
Texas.174 The government predicated its indictment upon alleged 
violations of a Texas criminal statute enacted in 1950, two years 
after the passage of the modern ACA.175 Sharpnack challenged 
the indictment, alleging that “Congress may not legislatively 
assimilate and adopt criminal statutes of a state which are 
enacted by the state subsequent to the enactment of the [ACA].”176  
The Sharpnack Court began its analysis by noting 
“[t]here is no doubt that Congress may validly adopt a criminal 
code for each federal enclave . . . . by copying laws defining the 
criminal offenses in force throughout the State in which the 
enclave is situated.”177 From this premise, the Court concluded 
that the ACA passed constitutional muster: “Having the power 
to assimilate the state laws, Congress obviously has like power 
to renew such assimilation annually or daily in order to keep 
the laws in the enclaves current with those in the States. That 
being so, we conclude that Congress [acted] within its 
constitutional powers . . . .”178 Sharpnack regarded the ACA not 
as an improper delegation of legislative power to the states, but 
as “a deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for federal 
enclaves of such unpre-empted offenses and punishments as 
shall have been already put in effect by the respective States 
for their own government.”179  
  
 171 Id. at 292 (emphasis added).  
 172 See Note, The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HARV. L. REV. 685, 688-
89 (1957) (discussing contemporary arguments that the ACA constituted “an 
unconstitutional delegation of Congress’ legislative power” but ultimately arguing that 
the statute was constitutional).  
 173 355 U.S. 286 (1958).  
 174 Id. at 286.  
 175 Id. at 286-87.  
 176 Id. at 287.  
 177 Id. at 293.  
 178 Id. at 293-94.  
 179 Id. at 294.  
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While the ACA’s critics persist,180 the Supreme Court 
never again questioned Congress’s authority to prospectively 
incorporate future state criminal statutes into the law 
governing federal enclaves. The Court traditionally scrutinizes 
federal penal statutes with extra care in light of “the limited 
constitutional power of Congress in criminal matters.”181 Thus, 
Congress possesses plenary power to enact non-criminal 
statutes continually adopting other aspects of state law into the 
law of federal enclaves.182  
B. Other Federal Assimilative Acts 
Following in the well-laid path of the ACA, Congress 
enacted a handful of statutes that continually adopt other 
aspects of contemporary state law for application within federal 
enclaves. Federal laws now make state workers’ compensation 
statutes,183 wrongful-death acts,184 and personal injury laws185 
applicable within federal enclaves. In addition, in 1947, 
Congress enacted the Buck Act, which authorizes states to 
collect income tax from individuals employed on federal 
enclaves within their borders.186  
While Congress should be lauded for enacting these 
statutes, such piecemeal legislation falls far short of adequately 
governing the nation’s enclaves. Congress has failed to 
implement modern state law in the areas of employment law,187 
  
 180 Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 
MD. L. REV. 707, 731 (2007); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation 
of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 249 (1997). 
 181 Bd. of Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305, 313 (1881).  
 182 Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294. 
 183 40 U.S.C. § 3172 (2006).  
 184 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006).  
 185 Id.  
 186 4 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  
 187 E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not 
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause 
of action); Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D.N.J. 2010) 
(holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Klausner 
v. Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
19, 2010) (holding that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal 
enclave); Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 15, 2010) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of 
whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court 
recognized cause of action); Rosseter v. Indus. Light & Magic, No. C 08-04545 WHA, 
2009 WL 210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (holding that state employment 
discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); Bussey v. Edison Int’l, Inc., No. 
CV 08-0158 AHM (RCx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 
2009) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not 
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housing law,188 consumer protection,189 contracts, agency, 
probate, guardianship, family relations, and noninjury torts.190 
In these arenas, outmoded nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century state laws prevail in most enclaves.  
III. LIMITATIONS UPON STATE CESSIONS OF JURISDICTION 
A. States May Reserve Limited Legislative Authority over 
Federal Enclaves as a Condition of Cession 
It is well settled that when a state gives its consent to 
federal acquisition of an enclave, it “may qualify its cession by 
reservations [of jurisdiction] not inconsistent with the 
  
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause 
of action); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 
4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (same); Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C-
06-03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (holding that state 
wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., 
No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (holding 
that state occupational safety laws and state common law action for wrongful 
termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave); Sundaram v. 
Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that common 
law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave 
established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Hutchinson v. 
Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 WL 691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 
2004) (same); Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998) 
(holding that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); 
George v. UXB Int’l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW, 1996 WL 241624, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 
3, 1996) (holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); 
Miller v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 697, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding 
that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); Snow v. 
Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that common 
law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave 
established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Lockhart v. MVM, 
Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 212-13 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that state employment 
discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, 
Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that common law action for 
wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established 
before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Dirt 
& Aggregate, Inc., 837 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Wash. 1992) (holding that state 
occupational safety laws inapplicable on federal enclave).  
 188 Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1037-38 (N.D. Cal. 
2005). The states have enacted unlawful-detainer statutes permitting expedited 
proceedings to evict individuals from rental housing. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1161 (West 2009). Because these provisions conflict with the federal rules of civil 
procedure, they are inapplicable in federal court; thus, removal proceedings, which 
take a few months in state court, can be prolonged for years in federal court. S.S. 
Silberblatt, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., Nos. 98-16570, 98-16572, 2000 WL 61295, at *2-3 
(9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2000); Traverso v. Clear Channel Outdoor Inc., No. C07-03629 MJJ, 
2007 WL 3151449, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2007).  
 189 Mersnick, 2007 WL 2669816, at *4 (holding that California consumer 
protection law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, inapplicable on federal enclave).  
 190 Castlen & Block, supra note 38, at 124. 
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governmental uses.”191 In James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,192 the 
Supreme Court considered the permissible scope of such 
reservations. In 1931, the United States acquired jurisdiction 
over land beneath and adjacent to the Ohio River to construct a 
dam.193 In the statute consenting to the federal government’s 
acquisition, West Virginia expressly reserved the right to 
exercise “concurrent jurisdiction” over the ceded property.194 
Later, the State sought to tax a general contractor conducting 
business within the cession.195 Dravo upheld West Virginia’s 
authority to impose the tax because the State validly reserved 
the right to exercise this power as a term of cession.196  
Unfortunately, West Virginia’s expansive reservation of 
jurisdiction is an anomaly. In most instances, states simply 
reserved the right to serve criminal and civil process within ceded 
territory.197 These routine reservations of jurisdiction are simply 
intended “to prevent [enclaves] from becoming . . . sanctuar[ies] 
for fugitives from justice.”198  
Additionally, once a state has ceded exclusive 
jurisdiction to the United States, it cannot retroactively 
reassert authority not claimed in the act of cession.199 In United 
States v. Unzeuta, the Supreme Court addressed a Nebraska 
statute seeking to retroactively reclaim concurrent criminal 
and civil jurisdiction over the Fort Robinson Military 
Reservation, a federal enclave.200 The Unzeuta Court struck 
down the statute, concluding that after a state cedes exclusive 
jurisdiction over an enclave to the federal government, prior 
state jurisdiction cannot “be recaptured by the action of the 
state alone . . . .”201 Congressional consent is required for a state 
to reclaim jurisdiction not reserved at the time of cession.202  
  
 191 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937).  
 192 Id. at 148.  
 193 Id. at 143. 
 194 Id. at 144.  
 195 Id. at 137.  
 196 Id. at 149.  
 197 Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 533 (1885). States also 
sometimes retain jurisdiction to tax sales made within an enclave, Collins v. Yosemite 
Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530 (1938), or to operate and make repairs to state 
roads intersecting an enclave. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 143 (1930).  
 198 Lowe, 114 U.S. at 534.  
 199 Unzeuta, 281 U.S. at 143.  
 200 Id. at 143.  
 201 Id.  
 202 Id. The Supreme Court has held that in the event the federal government 
were to wholly abandon a federal enclave, jurisdiction over the parcel would impliedly 
return to the surrounding state. S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 563-64 (1946); 
Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399, 403 (1896). This rule is necessary to prevent 
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B. Enclaves Remain Legally Part of the Surrounding State 
Notwithstanding Their Jurisdictional Status 
Because a state’s assent to transfer exclusive 
jurisdiction terminates its regulatory authority over an 
enclave, in the past most courts concluded that such property 
“cease[s] to be part of [the surrounding state].”203 The Supreme 
Court rejected this reasoning as fallacious in Howard v. 
Commissioners of the Sinking Fund.204 In that case, the Court 
addressed the purported annexation of a federal enclave by the 
city of Louisville, Kentucky.205  
In 1947 Congress enacted the Buck Act, authorizing 
states and municipalities to collect income taxes from 
individuals employed on federal enclaves within their 
borders.206 Shortly after passage of the Act, the city of Louisville 
enacted an ordinance annexing adjacent territory, including 
Naval Ordnance Station Louisville,207 a federal enclave 
established in 1941.208 Upon annexing the station, the city 
began taxing the incomes of workers employed there.209  
A group of station employees challenged the annexation 
and the income tax, asserting that the enclave “could not be 
annexed by the City since it ceased to be a part of the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky when exclusive jurisdiction over it 
was acquired by the United States.”210 The Supreme Court 
rejected this contention:  
When the United States . . . acquired the property upon which the 
Ordnance Plant is located, the property did not cease to be a part of 
Kentucky. The geographical structure of Kentucky remained the 
same. In rearranging the structural divisions of the Commonwealth, 
in accordance with state law, the area became a part of the City of 
  
abandoned property from devolving into Hobbesian states of nature. See S.R.A., 327 
U.S. at 563-64. But exclusive federal jurisdiction persists so long as the federal 
government “continues to hold [the enclave under] its primary jurisdiction and control.” 
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner, 376 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1964).  
 203 Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953) 
(referring to a decision by a Kentucky trial court). 
 204 344 U.S. 624.  
 205 Id. at 624-25.  
 206 4 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  
 207 Howard, 344 U.S. at 624-25.  
 208 Gun Weapon Systems Station Naval Ordnance Station Louisville (NOSL), 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/louisville.htm (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2011). The Howard decision never states the formal name of the station.  
 209 Howard, 344 U.S. at 625.  
 210 Id. at 626.  
2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 525 
Louisville, just as it remained a part of the County of Jefferson and 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky.211  
Because the station legally remained a part of 
Kentucky, the state retained the power to “conform its 
municipal structures to its own plan, so long as the state d[id] 
not interfere with the exercise of [exclusive] jurisdiction within 
the federal area by the United States.”212 The Howard Court 
concluded that the “change of municipal boundaries did not 
interfere in the least with the jurisdiction of the United States 
within the area or with its use or disposition of the property.”213 
Because the annexation was proper, the Buck Act empowered 
the city to tax the income of the enclave’s employees.214  
While Howard purports to lay to rest the century-old 
fiction that a federal enclave constitutes “a state within a 
state,”215 the Court reaffirmed the proposition that the 
Constitution vested “the United States power to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction within the area,” notwithstanding the 
municipal boundaries drawn by the state.216 Kentucky only 
possessed the authority to tax incomes earned within the 
enclave because Congress authorized it to do so.217 Otherwise, the 
state possessed no real power to regulate activities within the 
territory.218 Howard’s conclusion that an enclave legally remains 
part of the surrounding state is primarily a semantic distinction. 
As the Court explained in its most recent enclave decision, from 
a regulatory standpoint enclaves “are to [the surrounding state] 
as the territory of one of her sister states or a foreign land.”219  
C. Enclave Residents Retain the Right to Vote in State 
Elections 
The notion commonly embraced before Howard—that 
enclaves “ceased to be part of [the surrounding state]”220—imposed 
  
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 626-27.  
 213 Id. at 627.  
 214 Id. at 629.  
 215 Id. at 627. The Court’s conclusion that federal enclaves legally remain part 
of the surrounding state is difficult to square with the fact that the District of 
Columbia is a federal enclave and Congress’s power to create the District derived from 
the Enclave Clause. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963).  
 216 Howard, 344 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).  
 217 Id. at 628-29.  
 218 Id. at 627.  
 219 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973).  
 220 Howard, 344 U.S. at 626 (referring to a decision by a Kentucky trial court).  
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an additional consequence upon residents of federally governed 
territory: states routinely denied enclave residents the right to 
vote in local elections.221 The Supreme Court struck down this 
century-old limitation in Evans v. Cornman.222 Evans addresses an 
action brought by residents of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), a federal enclave located in Maryland, alleging that the 
State wrongfully denied them the right to vote.223 Relying on two 
grounds, the Court found that the Constitution guaranteed NIH 
residents the right to vote in Maryland elections, notwithstanding 
the facility’s enclave status.224  
First, the Evans Court concluded that state authorities 
improperly relied upon the assumption that the appellees were 
“not residents of Maryland” because “the NIH grounds ceased 
to be a part of Maryland when the enclave was created.”225 
Because Howard unequivocally rejects the “fiction” that an 
enclave constitutes “a state within a state,” this argument was 
untenable and thus “c[ould not] be resurrected . . . to deny 
appellees the right to vote.”226  
Second, the Court found that NIH residents possessed 
substantial interests in the outcome of state elections because 
Congress assimilated several components of contemporary 
Maryland law into the federalized state law that governed the 
enclave.227 NIH residents were subject to Maryland’s criminal law, 
its workers’ compensation statute, its wrongful-death act, and its 
income taxes.228 Thus, “residents of the NIH grounds [were] just as 
interested in and connected with [Maryland’s] electoral decisions 
as . . . their neighbors who live[d] off the enclave.”229 By denying 
suffrage to the enclave’s residents, Maryland literally subjected 
them to “taxation without representation.”230  
  
 221 E.g., Herken v. Glynn, 101 P.2d 946, 955 (Kan. 1940) (denying enclave 
residents the right to vote on the ground that the State had no jurisdiction over them); 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580, 580 (1841) (same); Langdon v. 
Jaramillo, 454 P.2d 269, 271 (N.M. 1969) (same); Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 317 
(1869) (same); McMahon v. Polk, 973 N.W. 77, 78-79 (S.D. 1897) (same); State ex rel. 
Lyle v. Willett, 975 S.W. 299, 302-03 (Tenn. 1906) (same).  
 222 398 U.S. 419 (1970).  
 223 Id. at 421-22.  
 224 Id. at 426. 
 225 Id. at 421.  
 226 Id. at 421-22 (citing Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 
U.S. 624, 627 (1953)).  
 227 Id. at 423-24.  
 228 Id. at 424.  
 229 Id. at 426.  
 230 JOHN JOACHIM ZUBLY, A HUMBLE ENQUIRY (1769), reprinted in PAMPHLETS 
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-76 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965). 
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Evans ultimately concludes that the Constitution 
guarantees enclave residents the right to vote notwithstanding 
the exercise of “exclusive federal jurisdiction” because the 
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal 
enclaves and those who [live in the surrounding state] are far 
more theoretical than real.”231  
IV. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE BARS COURTS FROM APPLYING 
MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW BALANCING TESTS TO CLAIMS 
ARISING FROM CONDUCT OR TRANSACTIONS WITHIN 
FEDERAL ENCLAVES 
Modern choice-of-law rules frequently authorize courts to 
apply a state’s law to an action arising from conduct that did not 
occur in that state.232 Courts applying these methodologies 
typically determine the applicable law by balancing the relative 
interests of the jurisdictions possessing contacts with the action.233  
For example, in one oft-cited conflicts decision, the New 
York Court of Appeals applied New York law to a personal-
injury suit stemming from an accident between two New 
Yorkers on an Ontario highway.234 The court concluded that 
“[c]omparison of the relative ‘contacts’ and ‘interests’ . . . make 
it clear that the concern of New York [wa]s unquestionably the 
greater and more direct” and Ontario’s interests were “at best 
minimal.”235 This was so because the action “involve[d] injuries 
sustained by a New York[er] . . . as the result of the [alleged] 
negligence of a [second] New York[er] . . . in the operation of an 
automobile . . . insured in New York.”236 Conversely, “Ontario’s 
sole relationship with the occurrence [wa]s the purely 
adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there.”237 
Thus, New York’s law governed because New York’s interests 
outweighed Ontario’s.  
  
 231 Evans, 398 U.S. at 424-25.  
 232 See generally Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1987) (discussing various choice-of-law methodologies).  
 233 Lawrence C. George, Asking the Right Questions, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
449, 460 (1987). I have criticized the modern choice of law methodology as an 
“‘inherently indeterminate and manipulable doctrine,’ which, in a great many cases, 
may be used to rationalize whatever law the judge feels inclined to apply.” Chad 
DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1037 (2011) (quoting 
Campbell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 890, 893 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 234 Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963).  
 235 Id.  
 236 Id.  
 237 Id.  
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Enclaves “are to [the surrounding state] as the territory 
of one of her sister states.”238 Therefore, if two New Yorkers who 
reside outside of a federal enclave litigate over an incident that 
occurred within an enclave, one might be tempted to argue that 
the court should apply modern New York law rather than the 
enclave’s federalized state law because New York possesses a 
greater interest in the litigation’s outcome. But this is not so.  
Enclave law, unlike state law, is distinctly federal in 
nature, notwithstanding the fact that it usually originated as 
state law.239 As such, the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause 
precludes courts from balancing such competing interests 
because federal law, when constitutionally authorized, always 
supersedes state law.240 “The supremacy clause . . . establishes a 
constitutional choice-of-law rule, mak[ing] federal law 
paramount . . . .”241  
This principle bars the application of the interest-
balancing tests employed by most states in choice-of-law 
cases.242 The Supremacy Clause, in effect, dictates that courts 
apply the traditional lex loci doctrine—that “the law of the 
[place] where the wrong occurred” governs an action243—to 
transactions arising within federal enclaves. The McGlinn 
doctrine dictates that when the pertinent events giving rise to 
a suit “occurred on a federal enclave” the court must apply the 
federalized state law applicable on the enclave.244 Thus, if a 
New York driver were to sue another New Yorker for damages 
to his car resulting from a collision within the confines of the 
Gateway National Recreation Area, a federal enclave lying on 
  
 238 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973).  
 239 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940).  
 240 Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976).  
 241 Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 
162 P.3d 569, 571 (Cal. 2007).  
 242 See Hancock, 426 U.S. at 178 (stating that because enclave law is federal, 
the Supremacy Clause dictates that it supersedes state law). 
 243 LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 17 (4th ed. 1995).  
 244 Snow v. Bechtel Constr., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986); 
accord Klausner v. Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (determining whether a claim arises on a federal enclave 
requires courts look to see where all the pertinent events took place); Rosseter v. Indus. 
Light & Magic, No. C 08-04545 WHA, 2009 WL 210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) 
(stating that the fact that defendant accused of tort maintains operations outside 
federal enclave is not pertinent in determining law applied to events occurring within 
enclave); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 
4948664, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (same); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 
2d 1138, 1148 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (determining whether a claim arises on a federal enclave 
requires courts look to see where all the pertinent events took place); Kelly v. Lockheed 
Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.P.R. 1998) (same); Lockhart v. MVM, Inc., 97 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 211-12 (Ct. App. 2009).  
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the outskirts of New York City,245 the Supremacy Clause 
dictates that a reviewing court would have to apply the 
enclave’s strict contributory-negligence bar—which survives as 
federalized state law—rather than New York’s modern 
comparative-fault law.246 This is so notwithstanding the fact 
that New York possesses materially greater interests in the 
outcome of the litigation than the federal government.247 
V. THE MCGLINN DOCTRINE CONVERTS ENCLAVES INTO 
JURISPRUDENTIAL JURASSIC PARKS 
While the ACA incorporates modern state criminal law, 
Congress has made little effort to update the body of private law 
applicable in its aging enclaves. As a result, federal enclaves—
which encompass almost 30 percent the United States248—have 
devolved into jurisprudential Jurassic Parks, where long-dead 
legal doctrines prey upon unsuspecting litigants. The Presidio of 
San Francisco exemplifies this phenomenon.  
California ceded exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidio to the 
federal government in 1897 to establish an army base.249 Today, the 
Presidio, now administered by the National Parks Service,250 is a 
bustling commercial center, home to thousands of people and the 
site of millions of dollars of commercial sales each year.251  
As noted in the introduction, in 2005, I represented a 
pro bono client, who resided on the Presidio, in an unlawful-
detainer action.252 I removed the case to federal court on the 
basis of federal-question jurisdiction because the law governing 
his suit was California’s 1872 unlawful-detainer statute, which 
lived on as federalized state law.253 Fortunately, my client did 
  
 245 See Friends of Gateway v. Slater, 257 F.3d 74, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 246 Congress established this enclave in 1972. Gateway National Recreation 
Area Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 460cc (2006). New York first enacted the comparative-
fault doctrine in 1975. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997). The contributory-
negligence doctrine would not apply to a personal-injury claim (as opposed to a 
property-damage claim) because Congress has incorporated contemporary state 
personal-injury law into enclave law. 16 U.S.C. § 457. 
 247 See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970) (noting the 
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal enclaves and those who [live 
in the surrounding state] are far more theoretical than real”).  
 248 Turley, supra note 28, at 362.  
 249 Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242, 244 (1934); Consol. Milk 
Producers v. Parker, 123 P.2d 440, 441 (1942).  
 250 Presidio of San Francisco Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C. § 460bb.  
 251 Levy, supra note 55, at A-1. 
 252 See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2005).  
 253 As federalized law, the “assimilated state [unlawful detainer] law [wa]s 
distinctly federal in nature,” thus “its application establishe[d] the basis for federal 
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not assert that his landlord breached the implied warranty of 
habitability. California did not recognize the existence of such a 
warranty until 1974, and thus it is not a part of the body of law 
governing the Presidio.254 The prior rule—which originated in 
the Middle Ages255—still prevails: “[T]he lessor is not obligated 
to repair unless he covenants to do so in the written lease 
contract.”256 The eviction statute applicable on the Presidio does 
offer one potentially troubling advantage to tenants; unlike 
modern statutes, the commission of a nuisance is not a valid 
ground for evicting a tenant.257  
Other proverbial dinosaurs roam the enclave. California 
eliminated the tort of alienation of affections258 in 1939.259 Yet 
this long-dead cause of action lives on in the Presidio as a sort 
of zombie tort.260 If one of the many thousands of Presidio 
residents were to carry on an extramarital affair with a 
neighbor, her jilted spouse could sue her lover.261 If the 
paramour were himself engaged to another woman residing in 
the Presidio, his would-be bride could likewise sue him for 
breach of contract to marry.262 California also eliminated this 
cause of action in 1939.263 The Presidio’s enclave status would, 
however, afford the lothario wide latitude to retaliate for these 
suits that he would not enjoy in other parts of the city. The 
causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and invasion of privacy do not exist on the enclave. California 
  
question jurisdiction.” Id. at 1038. My client resided in federal housing. Swords to 
Plowshares v. Kemp, No. C05-01661MJJ, 2005 WL 3882063, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 
2005). I removed the case to federal court because I planned to challenge his eviction on 
due-process grounds and I preferred to make this argument before a federal forum. 
This strategy proved successful. Id. at *1-2. 
 254 Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182 (Cal. 1974).  
 255 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  
 256 Id. at 1076.  
 257 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161 (Deering 1906). California’s contemporary 
unlawful detainer statute includes “nuisance” as a ground for terminating tenancy. 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161(4) (West 2009).  
 258 “[T]he common-law cause of action for alienation of affections had three 
elements: ‘(1) some wrongful conduct by the defendant with the plaintiff’s spouse, (2) the 
loss of affection or loss of consortium of plaintiff’s spouse, and (3) a causal relationship 
between the defendant’s conduct and the loss of consortium.’” Goutam U. Jois, Note, 
Marital Status as Property: Toward a New Jurisprudence for Gay Rights, 41 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 509, 533-34 (2006) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 259 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1939).  
 260 The lower federal courts have uniformly held that common-law rules in 
effect at the moment of cession live on until abrogated by Congress. See cases cited 
supra note 26. 
 261 Barlow v. Barnes, 155 P. 457, 457 (Cal. 1916).  
 262 Buelna v. Ryan, 73 P. 466, 467 (Cal. 1903).  
 263 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5(d).  
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did not recognize the emotional-distress tort until 1950.264 It 
first recognized the privacy action in 1973.265  
The Presidio is home to a high-end bicycle shop.266 Bike 
sales conducted at the shop are not governed by the UCC—
which California did not adopt until 1965267—but rather by 
nineteenth-century common law. Sales include no implied 
warranties. Rather, they are subject to the doctrine of caveat 
emptor.268 The bicycle shop is also immune from California’s 
consumer-protection and false-advertising laws, which were 
not enacted until 1941.269 If a car struck the rider of a bicycle 
within the boundaries of the enclave, the driver could avoid 
liability for damage to the bike by simply demonstrating any 
contributory negligence by the rider.270 California did not adopt 
the comparative-fault doctrine until 1975.271  
Perhaps most troubling of all, private companies employ 
several thousand workers at the Presidio.272 The enclave is the 
home of George Lucas’s special-effects studio, Industrial Light & 
Magic, which alone employs more than 1500 people.273 California, 
like most states, provides significantly greater employment-law 
rights and remedies to workers than the federal government 
provides.274 Yet, Presidio workers—most of whom presumably 
reside outside the enclave—enjoy only the modest protections of 
  
 264 Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 216 P.2d 571, 572-73 (Cal. App. 1950); see also 
Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on federal 
enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Stiefel v. 
Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (same); Celli v. Schoell, 995 
F. Supp. 1337, 1343-44 (D. Utah 1998) (same). 
 265 Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272 (Ct. App. 1973).  
 266 Paul McHugh, Sports Basement Ready to Shake, S.F. CHRON., June 14, 
2007, at D-7.  
 267 Marguerite Lee De Voll, Comment, Neither “Free” nor “Clear”: The Real 
Costs of In re PW, LLC: A Look at § 363(F)(3) and How to Protect Creditors, 26 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 167, 186 (2009).  
 268 Watson v. Sutro, 24 P. 172, 179 (Cal. 1890).  
 269 Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C-06-03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (holding that California consumer-protection law, CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, inapplicable on federal enclave established before its 
enactment); see Pfizer Inc. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840, 843 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting that California’s consumer protection and false advertising statutes were 
enacted in 1941). 
 270 See Basler v. Sacramento Gas & Elec. Co., 111 P. 530, 531-32 (Cal. 1910). 
The contributory-negligence doctrine would not apply to a personal-injury claim (as 
opposed to a property-damage claim) because Congress has incorporated contemporary 
state personal-injury law into enclave law. 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006).  
 271 Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975).  
 272 Levy, supra note 55, at A-1.  
 273 Id.  
 274 Romer-Friedman, supra note 41, at 503, 508, 511, 516.  
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laissez faire nineteenth-century state labor laws275 simply 
because they work in a two square-mile276 “federal island”277 
within San Francisco.278 This is not an anomaly. The Presidio is 
just one of five thousand federal enclaves established by 
Congress throughout the United States.279 Collectively, these 
enclaves are home to more than a million people.280  
Much of the blame for this state of affairs lies with 
Congress. The rule of international law upon which Canter and 
McGlinn rest presupposes that upon accepting jurisdiction over 
territory, a new sovereign will promptly establish new laws to 
govern the territory. The assimilation of existing municipal laws 
is intended only to serve as a stop-gap measure to prevent “a 
hiatus in the legal system of the . . . enclave.”281 Incorporated laws 
are not meant to survive into perpetuity because the new 
sovereign assumes an obligation to actually govern the territory.282 
For instance, when the United States acquired Florida from 
Spain, the United States promptly established a territorial 
legislature to govern the cession.283 “The power of Congress over 
federal enclaves . . . is . . . the same as the power of Congress over 
the District of Columbia.”284 When the federal government 
assumed jurisdiction over the District, the laws of Maryland 
likewise lived on as federalized state law.285 But Congress 
governed the District of Columbia.286 Congress has failed to 
provide such leadership for the multitude of other federal 
enclaves it established in the centuries that followed. As a result, 
  
 275 Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive 
Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (2009).  
 276 Carl Nolte, The Chance of a Lifetime at the Presidio, S.F. CHRON., June 14, 
1991, at A-21.  
 277 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 375 (1973). 
 278 The Presidio remains a part of San Francisco notwithstanding its 
jurisdictional status. Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 
626-27 (1953).  
 279 Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13 
(D.D.C. June 30, 1998).  
 280 Id.  
 281 Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D. Va. 1976); 
accord James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940). 
 282 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo. 1960) 
(asserting that adoption of preexisting state laws was intended to temporarily “fill the 
vacuum which would otherwise exist” in enclave private law).  
 283 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 541-42 (1828).  
 284 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963). 
 285 Busby v. Elec. Utils. Emps. Union, 323 U.S. 72, 73 (1944).  
 286 Armstrong v. Lear, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 169, 176 (1827).  
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nearly 30 percent of the United States287 has devolved into a 
“sanctuary for the obsolete restrictions of the common law.”288  
VI. THE MCGLINN DOCTRINE HAS PERNICIOUS EFFECTS 
UPON LABOR LAW 
Like other aspects of municipal law, state labor laws 
federalize at the moment a state cedes jurisdiction over an enclave 
to the federal government.289 In James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the application of a New York 
workplace-safety law on a federal enclave because the state 
enacted the law before cession.290 But state labor laws enacted after 
cession “are not a part of the body of laws in [an enclave]” because 
“[c]ongressional action is necessary to keep [them] current.”291  
Today, almost every state provides its workers with 
greater rights and remedies than federal law mandates.292 As 
one commentator noted, 
There are four main circumstances where a worker is substantively 
better off under state law than under federal law, including when 
(1) the state law provides an affirmative right, but the federal 
government has no equivalent right; (2) the federal law exempts a 
worker from protection, but the state law has no exemption; (3) the 
state law standard is more rigorous than the equivalent federal 
standard . . . ; and (4) the state law provides a greater remedy or 
time period to recover than federal law.293  
The precise situations where state labor law affords employees 
greater rights and remedies than federal law are too numerous 
to chronicle in detail here. Nonetheless, a few notable examples 
merit discussion.  
Eighteen states guarantee employees a higher 
minimum wage than federal law requires.294 Several states give 
employees significantly greater rights to medical leave to care 
for ailing family members than federal law provides.295 Twelve 
  
 287 Turley, supra note 28, at 362.  
 288 Capetola v. Barclay-White Co., 48 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1943).  
 289 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 103-04 (1940). 
 290 Id. at 104-05.  
 291 Id. at 100.  
 292 Romer-Friedman, supra note 41, at 503.  
 293 Id. at 503-04.  
 294 The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West, 
Westlaw through 2010 Sess.). As of January 1, 2012, eighteen states impose a higher 
minimum wage than required by federal law. Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm. 
 295 Michael J. Hayes, Leaving Maryland Workers Behind: A Comparison of State 
Employee Leave Statutes, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER & CLASS 19, 28 (2009). 
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states afford employees the right to receive benefits for 
dependents and domestic partners not provided by federal 
law.296 Five jurisdictions, California, Colorado, Nevada, Alaska, 
and Puerto Rico297—among the national leaders in federal land 
holdings298—require overtime pay for work exceeding a 
designated number of hours per day, while federal law only 
requires overtime for work in excess of forty hours per week.299  
While federal law prohibits discrimination “based on 
race, sex, age, religion, national origin, and disability,” several 
states expand such protections to groups outside the ambit of 
federal law.300 The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act 
imposes minimum workplace safety requirements on all 
employers.301 But most states have opted to establish their own 
parallel statutes, many of which impose significantly more 
stringent safety standards and enforcement schemes than 
federal law requires.302  
In addition, many states that have opted not to impose 
employment rules more rigorous than federal law nonetheless 
offer employees more significant state remedies for violations of 
the federally mandated standards.303 Because Congress 
established most federal enclaves prior to 1940,304 civilians 
  
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin provide employees greater rights to medical leave 
to care for ailing family members than the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. State 
Family Leave Laws that Are More Expansive than the Federal FMLA, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR 
WOMEN & FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Statesandunpaid 
FMLLaws.pdf?docID=968 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). These states provide employees 
greater rights to leave by expanding the family and medical leave requirements to 
businesses not covered by the FMLA, “allowing leave to be taken for additional purposes 
than those listed by the federal law, or providing a greater number of weeks of leave.” 
Hayes, supra at 28.  
 296 CAL. LAB. CODE § 233 (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1m (West Supp. 
2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-6 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2319-A (Supp. 2010); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-32 (West Supp. 2011); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 106.340 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-12-1 (Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 8 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.015 (West Supp. 2011).  
 297 Federal enclaves within Puerto Rico are subject to the same treatment as 
enclaves within the fifty states. See Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 
2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998).  
 298 Federal Lands in the Fifty States, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1996.  
 299 Questions and Answers About the FLSA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/faq.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).  
 300 Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption 
of Common Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116 (2007).  
 301 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006).  
 302 Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal 
Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535, 538-39 & n.27 (1987).  
 303 Romer-Friedman, supra note 41, at 504.  
 304 Most federal enclaves were established between 1840 and 1940. Wilkinson, 
supra note 12, at 152 n.21; see also supra note 53. 
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employed on enclaves typically enjoy none of these rights. 
Indeed, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century legislatures 
and courts expressed open hostility to working people and 
those who sought greater rights for laborers.305  
Federal courts routinely dismiss claims brought by 
enclave employees premised upon alleged violations of state 
labor laws enacted after the cession of jurisdiction.306 George 
Lucas’s Presidio-based special effects studio, Industrial Light & 
Magic, itself has been subject to two discrimination suits 
premised upon California labor law.307 On both occasions, the 
courts dismissed the state-law claims because California 
enacted the applicable statutes after the federal government 
assumed jurisdiction over the Presidio.308  
The lower federal courts have also unnecessarily 
compounded the problem by misreading the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arlington Hotel v. Fant to hold that state common-
law rules, like statutes, freeze in time at the moment of cession 
until altered by Congress.309 This places enclave workers at a 
serious disadvantage vis-à-vis their counterparts employed 
outside federal boundaries.  
Modern state common law typically affords victims of 
workplace harassment a right to invoke the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress to redress trauma stemming 
from abusive work environments.310 Because judicial recognition 
  
 305 McKay v. Retail Auto. Salesmen’s Local Union, 106 P.2d 373, 377 (Cal. 
1940), superseded by CAL LAB. CODE § 1115 (West 1947), as recognized in Chavez v. 
Sargent, 339 P.2d 801, 825 (Cal. 1959).  
 306 E.g., Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D.N.J. 
2010) (holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); 
Klausner v. Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (holding that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable 
on federal enclave); Rosseter v. Indus. Light & Magic, No. C08-04545 WHA, 2009 WL 
210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (same); Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C-06-
03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (holding that state 
wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., 
No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (holding 
that state occupational safety laws inapplicable on federal enclave); Hutchinson v. 
Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 WL 691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 
2004) (holding that state wrongful-termination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); 
Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998) (holding that 
state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); George v. 
UXB Int’l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW, 1996 WL 241624, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996) 
(holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Miller v. 
Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 697, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that state 
employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave).  
 307 Klausner, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4; Rosseter, 2009 WL 210452, at *2.  
 308 Klausner, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4; Rosseter, 2009 WL 210452, at *2. 
 309 See supra Part I.C. 
 310 Gonzalez, supra note 300, at 132-33.  
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of this tort postdates the establishment of virtually all federal 
enclaves,311 federal courts regularly deny enclave workers’ suits 
premised on this claim for relief.312  
A vast majority of states now recognize a cause of action 
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.313 State 
supreme courts first recognized these claims in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, most in the early 1980s.314 Prior to that 
time, such actions were strictly barred by the at-will 
employment doctrine.315 Courts routinely deny wrongful-
termination claims by enclave employees cognizable under state 
law because such actions did not exist at the time of cession.316  
A series of cases involving the dismissal of workers 
employed at California’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station illustrates the potential injustice of this precedent. In 
1963, the Southern California Edison Company acquired an 
easement from the Secretary of the Navy to build the San 
Onofre station on the Camp Pendleton Naval Reservation,317 a 
federal enclave near San Diego.318 The federal government 
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over Camp Pendleton in 1942.319 
Between 1986 and 2009, at least four San Onofre–based 
employees brought suit against Southern California Edison or 
general contractors it retained, alleging they were terminated 
  
 311 Most federal enclaves were established between 1840 and 1940. Wilkinson, 
supra note 12, at 152 n.21; see also supra note 53.  
 312 E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not 
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause 
of action); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (same); 
Celli v. Shoell, 995 F. Supp. 1337, 1343-44 (D. Utah 1998) (same).  
 313 Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A 
Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 774 n.154 (2006). 
 314 Id. (noting that Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 386-87 
(Conn. 1980), was one of the first decisions to recognize this cause of action). 
 315 Id. at 708.  
 316 E.g., Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497-98; Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No. 
4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2010); McMullen v. S. Cal. 
Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 
2008); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 
570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Hutchinson v. Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 WL 
691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2004); Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 
1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1993).  
 317 McMullen, 2008 WL 4948664, at *2 n.2.  
 318 United States v. Hernandez, 739 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that 
Camp Pendleton is located forty miles north of San Diego).  
 319 McMullen, 2008 WL 4948664, at *2.  
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in retaliation for reporting safety violations at the station.320 
One of the employees alleged Edison fired him in retaliation for 
reporting violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.321 A 
fifth worker sued Edison alleging the company terminated him 
for reporting workplace harassment at the station.322 The 
California courts first sustained the common law claim of 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy in 1959.323 
Camp Pendleton succumbed to federal jurisdiction in 1942.324 
Thus, in all five cases the federal courts dismissed the alleged 
whistleblower’s action because the common law wrongful-
termination tort was not part of the enclave’s law.325  
Congress undoubtedly possesses a strong interest in 
seeing that military personnel and federal workers employed 
on federal enclaves are immune from state labor laws. Private 
employers like Southern California Edison and George Lucas—
based on the mere happenstance of their locus on federal 
enclaves—deserve no such immunity. The immunity they 
presently enjoy stems not from a conscious decision to protect 
them, but rather from the federal government’s failure to keep 
enclave private law current.326 As a result of this abdication, 
Camp Pendleton and the Presidio’s enclave status afford 
Edison and Lucas protections that a squadron of imperial 
storm troopers would envy.  
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE 
MCGLINN DOCTRINE 
I propose a two-prong solution to the centuries-old 
federal-enclave problem. First, the federal courts, not Congress, 
should assume responsibility for keeping enclave common law 
current. Lower federal court precedent is erroneous in 
  
 320 Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497; Bussey v. Edison Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-0158 
AHM (RCx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009); Stiefel v. 
Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Snow, 647 F. Supp. at 1521. 
 321 Bussey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9.  
 322 McMullen, 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8. 
 323 Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497 (citing Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959)). California adopted the wrongful-termination tort long 
before the cause of action was recognized in other states. See Lord, supra note 313, at 
774-75 n.154.  
 324 Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497. 
 325 Id. at 497-98; Bussey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9-10; McMullen, 
2008 WL 4948664, at *7-9; Stiefel, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1149; Snow, 647 F. Supp. at 
1521. The San Onofre dismissals are of particular concern to me because I live within 
the plant’s fall-out zone.  
 326 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940). 
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concluding that the federal-enclave doctrine freezes in time 
state common-law rules. As federal instrumentalities, enclaves 
fall within the ambit of federal common law. It is well settled 
that in promulgating federal common law, the Constitution 
endows federal courts with the discretion to simply borrow 
from the ready-made common law of the surrounding state.327 
Thus, in most enclave-based cases, federal courts should simply 
apply the surrounding state’s common-law rules.  
Second, with respect to state labor codes, which generally 
fall outside the courts’ traditional common-lawmaking authority, 
I propose that Congress enact an Assimilative Labor Act—in the 
spirit of the ACA—affording the rights and remedies provided by 
contemporary state labor statutes to nongovernmental workers 
employed within federal enclaves. 
A. Enclave Status Should Not Freeze a Territory’s Common 
Law  
1. Private-Law Rules Applied in Actions Arising on 
Federal Enclaves Are Properly Governed by Federal 
Common Law  
Congress bears significant responsibility for the 
nonsensical state of the law governing federal enclaves.328 
Notwithstanding this legislative abdication, the most 
confounding aspects of enclave law could be remedied by the 
federal courts without the involvement of the political branches 
of government. The lower federal courts have uniformly 
misread the Supreme Court’s decision in Arlington Hotel v. 
Fant to apply the McGlinn doctrine to existing state common-
law rules.329 None of the Supreme Court’s enclave decisions 
actually address McGlinn’s effect on enclave common law.  
The Enclave Clause empowers Congress “[t]o exercise 
exclusive Legislation” over federal enclaves.330 But the 
Constitution is silent concerning the status of enclave common 
law.331 Precedent demonstrates that state courts necessarily 
  
 327 California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283 
(1982) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939)).  
 328 See supra Part V. 
 329 See supra Part I.C.  
 330 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 331 This is probably so because at the time of the founding, legal scholars 
generally viewed common law not as a form of government action, but rather as “‘a 
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it 
unless and until changed by statute.’” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) 
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lose their power to promulgate common-law rules for enclaves 
as each enclave is “to [the surrounding state] as the territory of 
one of her sister states or a foreign land.”332 But the 
Constitution does not require that enclave common law cease 
to evolve at the moment the federal government assumes 
jurisdiction. As federal instrumentalities, enclaves fall within 
the ambit of federal common law. History supports this 
position. “The power of Congress over federal 
enclaves . . . is . . . the same as the power of Congress over the 
District of Columbia.”333 The laws of Maryland lived on as 
federalized state law within the District for a time after federal 
acquisition.334 Until Congress established the District’s own 
Court of Appeals in 1970,335 the equivalent of a state supreme 
court, the District was subject to federal common law 
promulgated by Article III judges.336 While the population of 
Washington, D.C., exceeds that of other federal properties, 
many more people live or work collectively within other 
enclaves than in the District,337 and they deserve the same 
treatment as D.C. residents.338  
State regulatory authority over an enclave is 
extinguished at the moment of cession. But as with the District 
of Columbia, the regulatory power assumed by the United States 
as the new sovereign should be divided between the branches of 
the federal government in the usual fashion. Congress assumes 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction and thus the federal courts 
should logically assume the common-lawmaking role 
  
(quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-
36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Courts viewed this “transcendental body of law” as 
universally applicable irrespective of what sovereign governed a particular territory 
unless its legislature specifically enacted a statute abrogating it. Id. Thus, when a 
federal enclave was established, the “transcendental body” of common law remained 
applicable both inside and outside the enclave unless Congress enacted a statute 
abrogating it. Id.  
 332 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973).  
 333 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963). 
 334 Busby v. Elec. Utils. Emps. Union, 323 U.S. 72, 73 (1944).  
 335 M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 311-12 (D.C. 1971).  
 336 Peter L. Strauss, Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 
891, 907 (2002); M.A.P., 285 A.2d at 311-12. 
 337 See Mirel, supra note 11, at B01 (“Millions of people live in so-called 
federal enclaves, those territories that have been purchased by, or ceded to, the federal 
government for use as military bases, national parks and other federal facilities.”); 
Thompson & Williams, supra note 11, at B02 (noting that “the millions of federal 
enclave residents enjoy congressional representation—by voting either in their home 
state or the state where the enclave is located”).  
 338 It should be noted that federal enclave residents do possess one important 
right not possessed by D.C. residents: the right to vote in congressional elections. 
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1970).  
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traditionally occupied by the judicial branch. This is consistent 
with the rule of international law applied in American Insurance 
Co. v. Canter upon which the McGlinn doctrine is based.339 
Canter presumes “that whenever political jurisdiction” is 
“transferred from one nation or sovereign to another,” existing 
laws will remain in force indefinitely as the new sovereign 
assumes the functions previously performed by the outgoing 
government.340 The former sovereign’s laws live on for a time to 
prevent “a hiatus in the legal system of the [territory],”341 but the 
instrumentalities of the new sovereign’s administration may 
change them in any manner permissible within its system of 
government.342 In common-law countries, judges assume the 
primary responsibility for promulgating private-law rules.343 
Thus, when dominion over territory passes from one common-
law jurisdiction to another, the new sovereign’s courts should 
inherit the common-lawmaking responsibility from those of the 
former, just as the new sovereign’s assembly inherits legislative 
responsibility from its predecessor.  
When the United States achieved independence from 
Great Britain, each of the new states “received”344 “the common 
law of England [then] . . . in force” as “the rule of decision” in 
private-law cases until altered by their new governments.345 
Independence divested the Crown and its courts of jurisdiction 
over the states, but this did not terminate the existing body of 
common law, nor did it freeze that law in time until changed by 
the legislative branches of the new state governments.346 The state 
courts inherited the responsibility for maintaining the body of 
common law and the power to create new doctrines and abrogate 
rules promulgated by their English predecessors.347 When the 
  
 339 See supra Part I.A. 
 340 Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1885) 
(citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)).  
 341 Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D. Va. 1976); 
accord James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940). 
 342 Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99 (noting that state laws promulgated by state 
legislatures live on as federal law within enclaves “until abrogated” by Congress).  
 343 Tomlinson, supra note 130, at 107.  
 344 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of 
Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009).  
 345 Michael G. Collins, Justice Iredell, Choice of Law, and the Constitution—A 
Neglected Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 169 (2006) (referring to Virginia’s 
Receiving Act acknowledging receipt of the English common law until abrogated); see 
also Bellia & Clark, supra note 344, at 29 (noting that each of the thirteen original 
states expressly acknowledged “receiving” the English common law as the rule of 
decision in private-law cases after obtaining independence from Great Britain). 
 346 Bellia & Clark, supra note 344, at 29.  
 347 Id.  
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federal government assumes jurisdiction from a state, existing 
state common law should live on as English common law did. The 
courts of the new sovereign—the federal government—should 
inherit responsibility for maintaining that body of law.  
Adoption of the federal-common-law model I propose 
would obviate the bulk of the jurisprudential anomalies presented 
by the McGlinn doctrine. While state legislatures occasionally 
intervene to correct perceived deficiencies, both historically and in 
modern times, the vast majority of private-law development rests 
with the courts in their common-lawmaking function.348 Indeed, 
state legislatures have traditionally demonstrated indifference to 
the development of private law.349  
Recognition that enclave private law falls within the 
ambit of federal common law would empower federal courts to 
extinguish zombie-torts like alienation of affections and to place 
enclave citizens and workers, like the civilian employees of the 
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, on equal footing with 
their counterparts employed outside the enclave’s borders.350 
Denying enclave residents and employees such rights furthers 
no federal policy. The “differences . . . between . . . residents who 
live on federal enclaves and those who [live in the surrounding 
state] are far more theoretical than real.”351  
2. Federal Courts Should Ordinarily Borrow the 
Common-Law Rules of the Surrounding State 
Assumption of common-lawmaking responsibility for 
federal enclaves imposes only modest responsibility on federal 
courts. In the vast majority of cases, reviewing courts should 
simply “borrow” the surrounding state’s common-law rules for 
application within enclaves. It is well settled that matters 
falling within the ambit of federal common law “do not 
  
 348 Tomlinson, supra note 130, at 107. The McGlinn Court likely did not 
envision the modern state of federal-enclave law because pursuant to the Swift v. 
Tyson doctrine, then applicable, common law was viewed not as a form of state action, 
but rather as “‘a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but 
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.’” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Thus, when a federal enclave 
was established, the “transcendental body” of common law remained applicable both 
inside and outside the enclave unless Congress enacted a statute abrogating it. Id.  
 349 Peck, supra note 63, at 270.  
 350 Application of this principle would also put an end to the jurisprudential 
“crazy quilt” problem existing in enclaves consisting of tracts of land acquired at 
different times. See supra Part I.E. 
 351 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970). 
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inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules.”352 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that, when 
appropriate, state common law may be “borrowed and applied 
as the federal [common-law] rule for deciding the substantive 
legal issue at hand.”353 As the Court said in United States v. 
Kimbell Foods, Inc., “Whether to [borrow] state [common] law 
or to fashion a nationwide federal [common law] rule is a 
matter of judicial policy ‘dependent upon a variety of 
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific 
governmental interests and to the effects upon them of 
applying state law.’”354  
Federal courts engaging in the common-lawmaking 
process must make a case-by-case determination whether to 
fashion a federal rule or borrow applicable state law. Matters 
that require law that is “uniform in character throughout the 
Nation necessitate formulation of controlling federal [common-
law] rules.”355 “Conversely, when there is little need for a 
nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated 
as the federal rule of decision.”356 Further, “[a]part from 
considerations of uniformity,” the reviewing court “must also 
determine whether application of state law would frustrate 
specific [federal] objectives” and if so, the court “must fashion 
special rules solicitous of those federal interests.”357  
Federal courts should not necessarily borrow state 
common law in matters involving military personnel or 
government employees acting in their official capacities, but I 
posit that in the overwhelming majority of cases involving 
civilians or government officials acting in their private 
capacities, the courts should borrow law from the surrounding 
state. The Kimbell Foods factors weigh heavily in favor of this 
proposal. No need exists for a nationally uniform body of federal 
common law to govern suits between civilians arising within 
enclaves. The bulk of litigants involved in actions arising on 
enclaves are likely to be residents of the state encompassing the 
enclave. Thus, the surrounding state is likely to possess 
  
 352 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979).  
 353 California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283 
(1982) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939)); accord Kimbell 
Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28. 
 354 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 
332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947)).  
 355 Id. (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)).  
 356 Id.  
 357 Id.  
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materially greater interests in seeing that the policy decisions 
underlying its common-law rules are applied to the litigants. 
Moreover, the litigants involved in these suits are much more 
likely to be aware of the private-law rules of the surrounding 
state than of post hoc rules promulgated by federal courts.358  
Kimbell Foods’s final factor—barring state law 
application where it would serve to frustrate federal 
objectives359—may counsel against incorporation of state 
common law in a few cases. The courts must consider this 
issue, just as Kimbell Foods instructs, on a case-by-case basis.360 
But the vast majority of private-law actions on federal enclaves 
trigger no federal interests—even when the litigants are federal 
officials. If a married ranger at Yosemite National Park carried 
on an affair with one of his colleagues, no federal interests would 
be frustrated if a court borrowed modern California law denying 
the ranger’s wife the right to bring an action for alienation of 
affections.361 Similarly, allowing a private right of action for 
wrongful termination for a whistleblower employed by private 
enterprises, like Southern California Edison’s San Onofre 
nuclear plant, would frustrate no “specific [federal] objectives”362 
for a federal enclave like Camp Pendleton.363  
3. Federal Courts Should Borrow as Federal Common 
Law Subsequent State Statutory Enactments That 
Could Have Been Enacted by the State Courts 
While courts bear responsibility for the overwhelming 
majority of private-law development,364 legislatures do 
sometimes intervene to alter common-law rules.365 Nonetheless, 
usually legislative tweaks to the private law could have been 
made by the courts through the common-lawmaking process. 
  
 358 See Strass, supra note 29, at 758 (criticizing McGlinn doctrine’s application 
of past state laws because “[t]he cost of legal research would make most suits 
impractical, leaving . . . claims unenforceable due to financial necessity”).  
 359 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. 
 360 Id.  
 361 The federal government acquired exclusive legislative jurisdiction over 
Yosemite from California in 1920. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 
525-26 (1938). California eliminated the tort of alienation of affections in 1939. CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 43.5 (A.V. Lake & Co. 1939).  
 362 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. 
 363 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970) (noting that the 
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal enclaves and those who [live 
in the surrounding state] are far more theoretical than real”).  
 364 Tomlinson, supra note 130, at 107.  
 365 Id.  
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For example, California legislatively abolished the tort of 
alienation of affections.366 In other states, courts abolished the 
cause of action by judicial decision.367 Some states adopted the 
comparative-fault doctrine legislatively;368 in others, courts 
adopted the rule.369 The implied warranty of habitability for 
residential dwellings was likewise adopted by either the courts 
or the legislature, alternately, in different jurisdictions.370  
For this reason, I posit that federal courts are 
empowered to adopt as enclave common law subsequent 
legislative modifications of the private law made by a 
surrounding state so long as the modification at issue is of a 
type that could have been made by the state courts. If a 
particular modification falls within the ambit of a court’s 
ordinary common-lawmaking authority, why should the fact 
that the surrounding state enacted the change legislatively 
abrogate a federal court’s ability to adopt the change into the 
federal common law governing the enclave?  
Because the courts themselves created the entire body 
of private law in the first instance, the law of contracts, 
property, and torts falls within the courts’ common-lawmaking 
jurisdiction.371 Conversely, aspects of modern regulatory 
schemes that have no common-law antecedents, such as 
  
 366 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5.  
 367 E.g., Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Ky. 1992); O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 
733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986); Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 
1981); Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 453 (Wash. 1980).  
 368 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
21-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1979); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 
1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 58-607-1 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. 25-1151 (1975 reissue); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a (Supp. 1977). 
 369 E.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 
532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. 
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 899 (Ill. 1981); Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400, 434 (Mich. 1977).  
 370 Some state legislatures imposed the implied warranty of habitability. E.g., 
ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-7 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
25, § 5303 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-42 (1976); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 48-A:14, 540:13-d (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-86 to 80 (West 
Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 118 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.770 (1981); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 59.18.060 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. § 704.07 
(1979). In other jurisdictions, the courts adopted the doctrine. E.g., Javins v. First Nat’l 
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 
1168, 1184 (Cal. 1974); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 
1973); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1018 (Utah 1991). 
 371 See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 881 (W. Va. 1979) 
(finding that the enactment and abolition of private-law causes of action are within the 
ambit of the courts’ common-lawmaking function).  
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minimum-wage statutes, fall outside the ambit of the courts’ 
common-lawmaking power.372  
A federal court adjudicating an alienation-of-affections 
suit by a resident of the Presidio of San Francisco should 
pronounce the cause of action extinguished as a matter of 
federal common law, even though California abolished the tort 
legislatively. Similarly, a federal court considering the question 
of innkeepers’ liability at issue in Fant should adopt, as federal 
common law, Arkansas’s subsequent statutory repudiation of 
the former strict-liability rule.373 The enactment and abolition of 
such causes of action fall squarely within the ambit of the 
courts’ common-lawmaking function. The “power” of the courts 
“to alter or amend the common law” constitutes a 
quintessential feature of Anglo-American jurisprudence.374  
Indeed, even comprehensive legislative modifications to 
the private law can be adopted as federal common law if state 
courts could have made those changes. Contract law consists 
mostly of a body of judge-made rules enacted over several 
centuries.375 Legislative changes to the body of contract law by 
definition could have been made by the courts in the first 
instance.376 For this reason, federal courts deciding admiralty 
cases, which are governed by federal common law, have 
borrowed Article 2 of the UCC when adjudicating cases 
involving transactions in goods.377 The courts are empowered to 
do so because the UCC’s provisions could have been adopted by 
the courts in their common-lawmaking capacity.378 Federal courts 
adjudicating enclave-based contracts involving transactions in 
goods should likewise borrow the provisions of the UCC 
applicable in the surrounding state as federal common law.  
  
 372 See infra Part VII.B.  
 373 Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 445-46 (1929).  
 374 Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 881.  
 375 See generally 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 
§§ 1.5-1.7 (3d ed. 2004) (tracing the development of contract law from Early England to 
the modern United States). 
 376 See Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 
285-86 (1966) (arguing that the UCC fits neatly within and should be thought of as 
part of the body of the common law of contracts). 
 377 See, e.g., Princess Cruises, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 143 F.3d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 
1998); Southworth Mach. Co. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 40 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Interpool Ltd. v. Char Yigh Marine (Panama), S.A., 890 F.2d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1989), 
amended by 918 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1990); Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama 
Canal Co., 730 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). 
 378 See Gilmore, supra note 376, at 285-86 (arguing that the UCC fits neatly 
within and should be thought of as part of the body of the common law of contracts).  
546 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
As the courts have noted in borrowing the UCC for 
admiralty cases, incorporation of the code into contracts 
governed by federal common law serves the “goals of uniformity 
and predictability.”379 This is all the more true in the case of 
enclave-based contracts because the transacting parties are 
most often residents of the surrounding state.380  
B. Congress Should Enact a Federal Assimilative Labor Act 
While incorporating state private law into federal 
common law can remedy most of the private law anomalies 
created by the McGlinn doctrine, some state legislation falls 
outside the ambit of a court’s common-lawmaking authority. 
For example, courts lack the authority to enact many aspects of 
modern state labor codes, such as wage-and-hour provisions 
and workplace-safety ordinances. Thus, such ordinances cannot 
be incorporated as federal common law. To remedy inequities 
resulting from the inapplicability of state labor statutes on 
federal enclaves, I modestly propose that Congress enact a law 
in the vein of the ACA, making contemporary state labor and 
employment statutes applicable to nongovernment workers 
employed on federal enclaves.  
As the Sharpnack Court recognized, Congress can choose 
to adopt existing and future state statutes into the body of law 
applicable within enclaves.381 Using the Federal Reservations Act 
(which makes state wrongful-death statutes applicable on 
enclaves382) as a reference, Congress should enact the following:  
Extension of State Labor and Employment Laws to buildings, works, 
and property of the Federal Government. 
(a) Subject to the limitation enumerated in subsection (b), civilians 
employed by private enterprises within a national park or other 
place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, 
within the exterior boundaries of any State, shall possess the same 
rights and remedies accorded by the Labor and Employment Laws of 
the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and 
in any action brought to recover on account of violation of such laws 
the rights and remedies of the parties shall be governed by the laws 
of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be. 
  
 379 Princess Cruises, Inc., 143 F.3d at 832.  
 380 See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970) (noting that the 
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal enclaves and those who [live 
in the surrounding state] are far more theoretical than real”).  
 381 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1958).  
 382 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006).  
2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 547 
(b) A State Labor and Employment Law otherwise applicable under 
subsection (a) will be inapplicable within a national park or other 
place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States if 
application of such law would unduly burden specific federal 
objectives for the place.  
Like the ACA, this proposed statute would constitute “a 
deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for federal 
enclaves” of labor and employment laws “as shall have been 
already put in effect by the respective States for their own 
government.”383 It thereby places nongovernment workers 
employed on a federal enclave on par with their counterparts 
employed outside the enclave. Subsection (b) provides a safe 
harbor analogous to that offered by Kimbell Foods, enabling 
courts to decline to apply a state labor law if doing so “would 
frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the enclave.384  
In the overwhelming majority of cases, no federal 
objective justifies immunizing private employers such as 
George Lucas’s Industrial Light & Magic from state 
employment laws. The immunity presently enjoyed by enclave-
based enterprises exists only because of a historical accident. 
Congress should remedy that mistake as it previously did, 
making contemporary state criminal, wrongful-death and 
workers’ compensation statutes applicable within enclaves.  
CONCLUSION 
To many, the term federal enclave conjures images of 
distant military outposts on untamed frontiers. This is not an 
accurate picture. Over the last century, many enclaves evolved 
into bustling commercial centers,385 often lying within major 
metropolitan areas.386 Federal enclaves encompass a whopping 
659 million acres—almost 30 percent of the United States.387 
Millions of civilians live in, work in, or pass through them 
everyday388—most likely unaware of the potential legal 
  
 383 Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 293-94.  
 384 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).  
 385 See Levy, supra note 55, at A-1. 
 386 Gateway National Recreation Area Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 460cc (2006). 
 387 Turley, supra note 28, at 362.  
 388 See Mirel, supra note 11, at B01 (“Millions of people live in so-called 
federal enclaves, those territories that have been purchased by, or ceded to, the federal 
government for use as military bases, national parks and other federal facilities.”); 
Thompson & Williams, supra note 11, at B02 (noting that “the millions of federal 
enclave residents enjoy congressional representation—by voting either in their home 
state or the state where the enclave is located”).  
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consequences of doing so. Millions of dollars of commercial 
transactions take place within enclaves every year.389  
The McGlinn doctrine relegates these places to the 
status of jurisprudential Jurassic Parks, reanimating extinct 
legal precepts to wreak havoc on unwary citizens. Zombie-
doctrines like caveat emptor and the tort of alienation of 
affections lurk in the shadows, while modern innovations like 
implied warranties and the UCC do not exist. Worse yet, 
enclave status denies millions of state residents relief afforded 
under progressive state labor statutes enacted in the latter half 
of the twentieth century.  
Much of the blame for this state of affairs lies with 
Congress. The rule of international law upon which the 
McGlinn doctrine rests presupposes that upon assuming 
jurisdiction a new sovereign will establish new laws to govern the 
territory. The assimilation of existing municipal laws is intended 
only to serve as a stop-gap measure to prevent “a hiatus in the 
legal system.”390 Such laws are not meant to live into perpetuity. 
The new sovereign assumes an obligation to actually govern the 
territory. Congress has failed to fulfill this duty.  
Even greater fault rests with the federal courts. 
Responsibility for the vast majority of private-law development 
lies with the courts in their common-lawmaking function.391 
Federal acquisition should not freeze enclave common law at 
the moment of cession. As federal instrumentalities, federal 
courts must assume the responsibility to promulgate federal 
common law to govern enclave-based private-law disputes. The 
courts have failed in this duty despite the fact that it imposes 
only de minimis responsibilities. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kimbell Foods empowers the lower federal courts to simply 
borrow392 ready-made state common-law rules in cases where 
“there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law.”393 
Because the “differences . . . between . . . residents that live on 
federal enclaves and those who [live in the surrounding state] 
are far more theoretical than real,” in the overwhelming 
  
 389 Levy, supra note 55, at A-1.  
 390 Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D. Va. 1976); 
accord James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940). 
 391 Tomlinson, supra note 130, at 107.  
 392 California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283 
(1982); accord United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979). 
 393 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.  
2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 549 
majority of cases no federal need exists for a uniform body of 
enclave common law.394  
Borrowing state common law rules as federal common 
law would cure the bulk of the jurisprudential anomalies 
afflicting enclaves. Nonetheless, many provisions of state labor 
codes—particularly wage-and-hour and workplace-safety 
regulations—lie beyond the ambit of the courts’ traditional 
common-lawmaking authority. For this reason, I propose 
Congress utilize the familiar mold of the ACA to enact a 
statute making contemporary state labor and employment laws 
applicable within federal enclaves.  
More than 130 years after McGlinn’s cow stepped into 
the path of a Midwest train, the nation’s federal enclaves 
continue to wallow in a state of jurisprudential entropy. “The 
common law grows like a tree.”395 Failure to mend its branches 
undermines the very edifice of the Anglo-American legal 
system. As Justice Cardozo recognized, “If judges have woefully 
misinterpreted the mores of their day or if the mores of their 
day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in 
helpless submission, the hands of their successors.”396 For 
almost 30 percent of America’s territory, they do.  
  
 394 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970).  
 395 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 396 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 152 (1921).  
